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Abstract
This paper introduces endogenous and directed technical change in a growth model with environ-
mental constraints. A unique ￿nal good is produced by combining inputs from two sectors. One of these
sectors uses ￿dirty￿machines and thus creates environmental degradation. Research can be directed
to improving the technology of machines in either sector. We characterize dynamic tax policies that
achieve sustainable growth or maximize intertemporal welfare. We show that: (i) in the case where
the inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable, sustainable long-run growth can be achieved with temporary
taxation of dirty innovation and production; (ii) optimal policy involves both ￿carbon taxes￿and re-
search subsidies, so that excessive use of carbon taxes is avoided; (iii) delay in intervention is costly:
the sooner and the stronger is the policy response, the shorter is the slow growth transition phase; (iv)
the use of an exhaustible resource in dirty input production helps the switch to clean innovation under
laissez-faire when the two inputs are substitutes. Under reasonable parameter values and with su¢ cient
substitutability between inputs, it is optimal to redirect technical change towards clean technologies
immediately and optimal environmental regulation need not reduce long-run growth.
JEL Classi￿cation: O30, O31, O33, C65.
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{Harvard University.1 Introduction
How to control and limit climate change caused by our growing consumption of fossil fuels
and to develop alternative energy sources to these fossil fuels are among the most pressing
policy challenges facing the world today.1 While a large part of the discussion among cli-
mate scientists focuses on the e⁄ect of various policies on the development of alternative￿ and
more ￿environmentally friendly￿ ￿ energy sources, the response of technological change to en-
vironmental policy has until very recently been all but ignored by leading economic analyses of
environment policy, which have mostly focused on computable general equilibrium models with
exogenous technology.2 This omission is despite the fact that existing empirical evidence indi-
cates that changes in the relative price of energy inputs have an important e⁄ect on the types
of technologies that are developed and adopted. For example, Newell, Ja⁄e and Stavins (1999)
show that when energy prices were stable, innovations in air-conditioning reduced the prices
faced by consumers, but following the oil price hikes, air-conditioners became more energy
e¢ cient. Popp (2002) provides more systematic evidence on the same point by using patent
data from 1970 to 1994; he documents the impact of energy prices on patents for energy-saving
innovations.
A satisfactory framework for the study of the costs and bene￿ts of di⁄erent environmental
policies must therefore include at its centerpiece the endogenous response of di⁄erent types of
technologies to proposed policies. Our purpose is to take a ￿rst step towards the development
of such a framework. We propose a simple two-sector model of directed technical change.
The unique ￿nal good is produced by combining the inputs produced by these two sectors.
One of them uses ￿dirty￿machines and creates environmental degradation. Pro￿t-maximizing
researchers build on previous innovations (￿build on the shoulders of giants￿ ) and direct their
research to improving the quality of machines in one or the other sector.
Our framework highlights the central roles played by the market size and the price e⁄ects
on the direction of technical change (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002). The market size e⁄ect encourages
innovation towards the larger input sector, while the price e⁄ect directs innovation towards the
sector with higher price. The relative magnitudes of these e⁄ects are, in turn, determined by
three factors: (1) the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors; (2) the relative levels
of development of the technologies of the two sectors; (3) whether dirty inputs are produced
using an exhaustible resource. Because of the environmental externality, the decentralized
equilibrium is not optimal. Moreover, the laissez-faire equilibrium typically leads to an ￿envi-
ronmental disaster,￿where the quality of the environment falls below a critical threshold.
Our main results focus on the types of policies that can prevent such disasters, the struc-
1See, for instance, Stott et al. (2004) on the contribution of human activity to the European heatwave of
2003, Emanuel (2005) and Landsea (2005) on the increased impact and destructiveness of tropical cyclones and
Atlantic hurricanes over the last decades, and Nicholls and Lowe (2006) on sea-level rise.
2See, e.g., Nordhaus (1994), MacCracken et al. (1999), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).
1ture of optimal environmental regulation and its long-run growth implications, and the costs of
delay in implementing environmental regulation. Approaches based on exogenous technology
lead to three di⁄erent types of answers to (some of) these questions depending on their assump-
tions. Simplifying existing approaches and assigning colorful labels, we can summarize these
as follows. The Nordhaus answer is that only limited and gradual interventions are necessary.
Optimal regulations should only reduce long-run growth by a modest amount. The Stern/Al
Gore answer is less optimistic. It calls for more extensive and immediate interventions, and
argues that these interventions need to be in place permanently and will likely reduce long-run
growth as the price for avoiding an environmental disaster. The more pessimistic Greenpeace
answer is that essentially all growth needs to come to an end in order to save the planet.
Against this background, our analysis suggests a very di⁄erent answer. In the empirically
plausible case where the two sectors (clean and dirty inputs) are highly substitutable, imme-
diate and decisive intervention is indeed necessary. Without intervention, the economy would
rapidly head towards an environmental disaster, particularly because the market size e⁄ect
and the initial productivity advantage of dirty inputs would direct innovation and production
to that sector, contributing to environmental degradation. However, optimal environmental
regulation, or even simple suboptimal policies just using carbon taxes or pro￿t taxes/research
subsidies, would be su¢ cient to redirect technical change and avoid an environmental disaster.
Moreover, these policies only need to be in place for a temporary period, because once clean
technologies are su¢ ciently advanced, research would be directed towards these technologies
without further government intervention. Consequently, environmental goals can be achieved
without permanent intervention and without sacri￿cing (much or any) long-run growth. While
this conclusion is even more optimistic than Nordhaus￿ s answer, as in the Stern/Al Gore or
Greenpeace perspectives delay costs are signi￿cant, not simply because of the direct environ-
mental damage, but because delay increases the technological gap between clean and dirty
sectors, necessitating a more extended period of economic slowdown in the future.
Notably, our model also nests the Stern/Al Gore and Greenpeace answers. When the two
sectors are substitutable but not su¢ ciently so, preventing an environmental disaster requires
a permanent policy intervention. Finally, when the two sectors are complementary, the only
way to stave o⁄ a disaster is to stop long-run growth.
A simple but important implication of our analysis is that optimal environmental regulation
should always use both an input tax (￿carbon tax￿ ) to control current emissions and research
subsidies or pro￿t taxes to in￿ uence the direction of research. Even though a carbon tax
would by itself discourage research in the dirty sector, using this tax both to reduce current
emissions and to in￿ uence the path of research would lead to excessive distortions. Instead,
optimal policy relies less on a carbon tax, and even more so on direct encouragement to the
development of clean technologies.
Our framework also illustrates the e⁄ects of exhaustibility of resources on the laissez-faire
2equilibrium and on the structure of optimal policy. An environmental disaster is less likely when
the dirty sector uses an exhaustible resource (provided that the two sectors have a high degree
of substitution) because the increase in the price of the resource as it is depleted reduces its use,
and this encourages research towards clean technologies. Thus, an environmental disaster could
be avoided without government intervention. Nevertheless, we also show that the structure
of optimal environmental regulation looks broadly similar to the case without an exhaustible
resource and again relies both on carbon taxes and research subsidies.
As a ￿rst step towards a quantitative analysis of environmental policy in the presence of
endogenous and directed technical change, we also perform a simple calibration exercise. We
￿nd that for high (but reasonable) elasticities of substitution between clean and dirty inputs
(nonfossil and fossil fuels), the optimal policy in the presence of directed technical change
involves an immediate switch of all R&D e⁄ort to clean technologies. When clean and dirty
inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable, the structure of optimal environmental policy appears
broadly robust to di⁄erent values of the discount rate (which is the main source of the di⁄erent
conclusions in the Stern report or in Nordhaus￿ s research).
Our paper relates to the literature on growth, resources, and the environment. Nord-
haus￿ s (1994) pioneering study proposed a dynamic integrated model of climate change and
the economy (the DICE model), which extends the neoclassical Ramsey model with equations
representing emissions and climate change. In our calibration exercise we build on Nordhaus￿ s
study and results. Another branch of the literature focuses on the measurement of the costs
of climate change, particularly stressing issues related to risk, uncertainty and discounting.3
Based on the assessment of discounting and related issues, this literature has prescribed either
decisive and immediate governmental action (e.g., Stern, 2006) or a more gradualist approach
(e.g., Nordhaus, 2004), with modest control in the short-run followed by sharper emissions
reduction in the medium and the long run. Recent work by Golosov et al. (2009) character-
izes the structure of optimal policies in a model with exogenous technology and exhaustible
resources, where oil suppliers set prices to maximize discounted pro￿ts. They show that the
optimal resource tax should be decreasing over time. Finally, some authors, for example, Hep-
burn (2006) and Pizer (2002), have built on Weitzman￿ s (1974) analysis on the use of price or
quantity instruments to study climate change policy and the choice between taxes and quotas.
The response of technology to environmental degradation and environmental policy, our
main focus in this paper, has received much less attention in the economics literature, however.
Early work by Stokey (1998) highlighted the tension between growth and the environment,
and showed that degradation of the environment can create an endogenous limit to growth.
Aghion and Howitt (1998, Chapter 5) emphasized that environmental constraints may not
prevent sustainable long-run growth when ￿environment-friendly￿ innovations are allowed.
3For example, Stern (2006), Weitzman (2007, 2009), Dasgupta (2007, 2008), Nordhaus (2007), von Below
and Persson (2008), Mendelsohn (2007), and Tol and Yohe (2006).
3Recent research by Jones (2009) provides a systematic analysis of conditions under which
environmental and other costs of growth will outweigh its bene￿ts. Neither of these early
contributions allowed technical change to be directed to clean or dirty technologies.
Subsequent work by Popp (2004) allowed for directed innovation in the energy sector.
Popp presents a calibration exercise and establishes that models that ignore the directed tech-
nical change e⁄ects can signi￿cantly overstate the cost of environmental regulation. While
Popp￿ s work is highly complementary to ours, neither his work nor others develop a system-
atic framework for the analysis of the impact of environmental regulations on the direction
of technological change. We develop a general and tractable framework to perform systematic
comparative analyses for the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of policies on innovation, growth and
environmental resources, to characterize the structure of optimal regulation, and to study the
implications of dirty inputs using exhaustible resources.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our general
framework. Section 3 focuses on the case without an exhaustible resource. It shows that
laissez-faire equilibrium leads to an environmental disaster. It then shows how simple policy
interventions can prevent environmental disasters and clari￿es the role of directed technical
change in these results. Section 4 characterizes the structure of optimal environmental policy
in this setup. Section 5 studies the economy with exhaustible resources. Section 6 provides a
preliminary quantitative assessment of how directed technical change a⁄ects the structure of
optimal policy under reasonable parameter values. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains
the proofs of some of the key results stated in the text, while Appendix B, which is available
online, contains the remaining proofs and additional quantitative exercises.
2 General Framework
We consider an in￿nite-horizon discrete-time economy inhabited by a continuum of house-
holds comprising workers, entrepreneurs and scientists. We assume that all households have






where Ct is consumption of the unique ￿nal good at time t, St denotes the quality of the
environment at time t, and ￿ > 0 is the discount rate.5 We assume that St 2 [0;S], where S is
4First attempts at introducing endogenous directed technical change in models of growth and the environment
build, as we do, on Acemoglu (1998, 2002) and include Grubler and Messner (1998), Manne and Richels (2002),
Messner (1997), Buonanno et al. (2003), Nordhaus (2002), Sue Wing (2003), and Di Maria and Valente (2006).
Grimaud and Rouge (2008), Gans (2009) and Aghion and Howitt (2009, Chapter 16) are more closely related
to the approach followed in this paper. The early contribution by Goulder and Schneider (1999) studied the
sectoral implications of CO2 abatement policies in a model with endogenous R&D.
5For now, S can be thought of as a measure of general environmental quality. In our quantitative exercise
in Section 6, we explicitly relate S to the increase in temperature since pre-industrial times and to carbon
4the quality of the environment absent any human pollution, and to simplify the notation, we
also assume that this is the initial level of environmental quality, that is, S0 = S.
The instantaneous utility function u(C;S) is increasing both in C and S, twice di⁄erentiable









= 1, and lim
S#0
u(C;S) = ￿1: (2)
The last two conditions imply that the quality of the environment reaching its lower bound







which implies that when S reaches S, the value of the marginal increase in environmental
quality is small. This assumption is adopted to simplify the characterization of optimal envi-
ronmental policy in Section 4.
There is a unique ￿nal good, produced competitively using ￿clean￿and ￿dirty￿inputs, Yc













where " 2 (0;+1) is the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors and we suppress
the distribution parameter for notational simplicity. Throughout, we say that the two sectors
are (gross) substitutes when " > 1 and (gross) complements when " < 1 (throughout we ignore
the ￿Cobb-Douglas￿case of " = 1).6 The case of substitutes " > 1 (in fact, an elasticity of
substitution signi￿cantly greater than 1) appears as the more empirically relevant benchmark,
since we would expect successful clean technologies to substitute for the functions of dirty
technologies. For this reason, throughout the paper we assume that " > 1 unless speci￿ed
otherwise (the corresponding results for the case of " < 1 are discussed in subsection 3.4).
The two inputs, Yc and Yd, are produced using labor and a continuum of sector-speci￿c


















concentration in the atmosphere.
6The degree of substitution, which plays a central role in the model, has a clear empirical counterpart. For
example, renewable energy, provided it can be stored and transported e¢ ciently, would be highly substitutable
with energy derived from fossil fuels. This reasoning would suggest a (very) high degree of substitution between
dirty and clean inputs, since the same production services can be obtained from alternative energy with less
pollution. In contrast, if the ￿clean alternative￿ were to reduce our consumption of energy permanently, for
example by using less e⁄ective transport technologies, this would correspond to a low degree of substitution,
since greater consumption of non-energy commodities would increase the demand for energy. More generally, this
parameter, though not systematically investigated by existing research, should be estimated in future empirical
work and become a crucial input into the design of environmental policy.
5where ￿;￿1;￿2 2 (0;1), ￿1 + ￿2 = ￿, Ajit is the quality of machine of type i used in sector
j 2 fc;dg at time t, xjit is the quantity of this machine and Rt is the ￿ ow consumption from
an exhaustible resource at time t. The evolution of the exhaustible resource is given by the
di⁄erence equation:
Qt+1 = Qt ￿ Rt; (6)
where Qt is the resource stock at date t. The per unit extraction cost for the exhaustible
resource is c(Qt), where Qt denotes the resource stock at date t, and c is a non-increasing
function of Q. In Section 5, we study two alternative market structures for the exhaustible
resource, one in which it is a ￿common resource￿so that the user cost at time t is given by
c(Qt), and one in which property rights to the exhaustible resource are vested with in￿nitely-
lived ￿rms (or consumers), in which case the user cost will be determined by the Hotelling
rule. Note that the special case where ￿2 = 0 (and thus ￿1 = ￿) corresponds to an economy
without the exhaustible resource, and we will ￿rst analyze this special case.
Market clearing for labor requires labor demand to be less than total labor supply, which
is normalized to 1, i.e.,
Lct + Ldt ￿ 1: (7)
In line with the literature on endogenous technical change, machines (for both sectors) are
supplied by monopolistically competitive ￿rms. Regardless of the quality of machines and of
the sector for which they are designed, producing one unit of any machine costs   units of the
￿nal good. Without loss of generality, we normalize   ￿ ￿2.
Market clearing for the ￿nal good implies that









The innovation possibilities frontier is as follows. At the beginning of every period, each
scientist decides whether to direct her research to clean or dirty technology. She is then
randomly allocated to at most one machine (without any congestion; so that each machine
is also allocated to at most one scientist) and is successful in innovation with probability
￿j 2 (0;1) in sector j 2 fc;dg, where innovation increases the quality of a machine by a factor
1+￿ (with ￿ > 0), that is, from Ajit to (1+￿)Ajit. A successful scientist (who has invented a
better version of machine i in sector j 2 fc;dg) obtains a one-period patent and becomes the
entrepreneur for the current period in the production of machine i. In sectors where innovation
is not successful, monopoly rights are allocated randomly to an entrepreneur drawn from the
pool of potential entrepreneurs who then use the old technology.7 This innovation possibilities
7The assumptions here are adopted to simplify the exposition and mimic the structure of equilibrium in
continuous time models as in Acemoglu (2002) (see also Aghion and Howitt, 2009, for this approach). We
adopt a discrete time setup throughout to simplify the analysis of dynamics. Appendix B shows that the
qualitative results are identical in an alternative formulation with patents and free entry (instead of monopoly
rights being allocated to entrepreneurs).
6frontier where scientists can only target a sector (rather than a speci￿c machine) ensures
that scientists are allocated across the di⁄erent machines in a sector.8 We also normalize the
measure of scientists s to 1 and denote the mass of scientists working on machines in sector
j 2 fc;dg at time t by sjt. Market clearing for scientists then takes the form
sct + sdt ￿ 1: (9)





as the average productivity in sector j 2 fc;dg, which implies that Adt corresponds to ￿dirty
technologies,￿while Act represents ￿clean technologies￿ . The speci￿cation for the innovation







Finally, the quality of the environment, St, evolves according to the di⁄erence equation
St+1 = ￿￿Ydt + (1 + ￿)St; (12)
whenever the right hand side of (12) is in the interval (0;S). Whenever the right hand side
is negative, St+1 = 0, and whenever the right hand side is greater than S, St+1 = S (or
equivalently, St+1 = max
￿
minh￿￿Ydt + (1 + ￿)St;i0;S
￿
). The parameter ￿ measures the
rate of environmental degradation resulting from the production of dirty inputs, and ￿ is the
rate of ￿environmental regeneration￿ . Recall also that S is the initial and the maximum
level of environmental quality corresponding to zero pollution. This equation introduces the
environmental externality, which is caused by the production of the dirty input.
Equation (12) encapsulates several important features of environmental change in practice.
First, the exponential regeneration rate ￿ captures the idea that greater environmental degra-
dation is typically presumed to lower the regeneration capacity of the globe. For example,
part of the carbon in the atmosphere is absorbed by the ice cap; as the ice cap melts because
of global warming, more carbon is released into the atmosphere and the albedo of the planet
8As highlighted further by equation (11) below, this structure implies that innovation builds on the existing
level of quality of a machine, and thus incorporates the ￿building on the shoulders of giants￿feature. In terms of
the framework in Acemoglu (2002), this implies that there is ￿state dependence￿in the innovation possibilities
frontier, in the sense that advances in one sector make future advances in that sector more pro￿table or more
e⁄ective. This is a natural feature in the current context, since improvements in fossil fuel technology should
not (and in practice do not) directly translate into innovations in alternative and renewable energy sources.
Nevertheless, one could allow some spillovers between the two sectors, that is, ￿limited state dependence￿as in
Acemoglu (2002). In particular, in the current context, we could adopt a more general formulation which would




￿j (Ajt￿1;A￿jt￿1), for j 2 fc;dg, where ￿ j denotes
the other sector and ￿j is a linearly homogeneous function. Our qualitative results continue to hold provided
that ￿c (Ac;Ad) has an elasticity of substitution greater than one as Ac=Ad ! 1 (since in this case ￿c becomes
e⁄ectively linear in Ac in the limit where innovation is directed at clean technologies).
7is reduced, further contributing to global warming. Similarly, the depletion of forests reduces
carbon absorption, also contributing to global warming. Second, the upper bound S captures
the idea that environmental degradation results from pollution, and that pollution cannot be
negative. We discuss below how our results change under alternative laws of motion for the
quality of the environment.
Equation (12) also incorporates, in a simple way, the major concern of the majority of
climate scientists, that the environment may deteriorate so much as to reach a ￿point of no
return￿ . In particular, if St = 0, then S￿ will remain at 0 for all ￿ > t. Our assumption
that limS#0 u(C;S) = ￿1 implies that St = 0 for any ￿nite t cannot be part of a welfare-
maximizing allocation (for any ￿ < 1). Motivated by this feature, we de￿ne the notion of an
environmental disaster, which will be useful for developing the main intuitions of our model.
De￿nition 1 An environmental disaster occurs if St = 0 for some t < 1.
3 Environmental Disaster without Exhaustible Resources
In this and the next section, we focus on the case with ￿2 = 0 (and thus ￿1 = ￿), where the
production of the dirty input does not use the exhaustible resource. This case is of interest
for several reasons. First, because the production technologies of clean and dirty inputs are
symmetric in this case, the e⁄ects of directed technical change can be seen more transparently.
Second, we believe that this case is of considerable empirical relevance, since the issue of
exhaustability appears secondary in several activities contributing to climate change, including
deforestation and power generation using coal (where the exhaustiblity constraint is unlikely
to be binding for a long time). We return to the more general case where ￿2 6= 0 in Section 5.
3.1 The laissez-faire equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize the laissez-faire equilibrium outcome, that is, the decen-
tralized equilibrium without any policy intervention. We ￿rst characterize the equilibrium
production and labor decisions for given productivity parameters. We then analyze the direc-
tion of technical change.
An equilibrium is given by sequences of wages (wt), prices for inputs (pjt), prices for ma-
chines (pjit), demands for machines (xjit), demands for inputs (Yjt), labor demands (Ljt) by
input producers j 2 fc;dg, research allocations (sdt;sct), and quality of environment (St) such
that, in each period t: (i) (pjit;xjit) maximizes pro￿ts by the producer of machine i in sector j;
(ii) Ljt maximizes pro￿ts by producers of input j; (iii) Yjt maximizes the pro￿ts of ￿nal good
producers; (iv) (sdt;sct) maximizes the expected pro￿t of a researcher at date t; (v) the wage
wt and the prices pjt clear the labor and input markets respectively; and (vi) the evolution of
St is given by (12).
8To simplify the notation, we de￿ne ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ") and impose the following assump-

























This assumption imposes the reasonable condition that initially the clean sector is su¢ -
ciently backward relative to the dirty (fossil fuel) sector that under laissez-faire the economy
starts innovating in the dirty sector. This assumption enables us to focus on the more relevant
part of the parameter space (Appendix A provides the general characterization).
We ￿rst consider the equilibrium at time t for given technology levels Acit and Adit. As the










This equation implies that the relative price of clean inputs (compared to dirty inputs) is de-
creasing in their relative supply, and moreover, that the elasticity of the relative price response
is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. We normalize the price







To determine the evolution of average productivities in the two sectors, we need to char-
acterize the pro￿tability of research in these sectors, which will determine the direction of
technical change. The equilibrium pro￿ts of machine producers endowed with technology Ajit
can be written as (see Appendix A):




Taking into account the probability of success and using the de￿nition of average produc-
tivity in (10), the expected pro￿t ￿jt for a scientist engaging in research in sector j at time t
is therefore:




where the second line simply uses (10). Consequently, the relative bene￿t from undertaking




















Adt￿1 | {z }
direct productivity e⁄ect
: (17)
9The higher this ratio, the more pro￿table is R&D directed towards the clean technologies. This
equation shows that incentives to innovate in the clean versus the dirty sector machines are
shaped by three forces: (i) the direct productivity e⁄ect (captured by the term Act￿1=Adt￿1),
which pushes towards innovating in the sector with higher productivity; this force results from
the presence of the ￿building on the shoulders of giants￿ e⁄ect highlighted in (11); (ii) the
price e⁄ect (captured by the term (pct=pdt)
1
1￿￿), encouraging innovation towards the sector
with higher prices, which is naturally the relatively backward sector; (iii) the market size e⁄ect
(captured by the term Lct=Ldt), encouraging innovation in the sector with greater employment,
and thus with the larger market for machines￿ when the two inputs are substitutes (" > 1),
this is also the sector with the higher aggregate productivity. Appendix A develops these














The next lemma then directly follows from (18).
Lemma 1 Under laissez-faire it is an equilibrium for innovation at time t to occur in the clean
sector only when ￿cA
￿’
ct￿1 > ￿d (1 + ￿￿c)
’+1 A
￿’






dt￿1, and in both sectors when ￿c (1 + ￿￿dsdt)
’+1 A
￿’




sct + sdt = 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The noteworthy conclusion of this lemma is that innovation will favor the more advanced
sector when " > 1 (which, in (18), corresponds to ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ") < 0).


































Using these expressions and Lemma 1, we establish:
Proposition 1 Suppose that " > 1 and Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a unique
laissez-faire equilibrium where innovation always occurs in the dirty sector only, and the long-
run growth rate of dirty input production is ￿￿d.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since the two inputs are substitutes (" > 1), innovation starts in the dirty sector, which
is more advanced initially (Assumption 1). This increases the gap between the dirty and the
clean sectors and the initial pattern of equilibrium is reinforced: only Ad grows (at the rate
￿￿d > 0) and Ac remains constant. Moreover, since ’ is negative in this case, (19) implies that
in the long run Yd also grows at the rate ￿￿d.
103.2 Directed technical change and environmental disaster
In this subsection, we show that the laissez-faire equilibrium leads to an environmental disaster
and illustrate how a simple policy of ￿redirecting technical change￿can avoid this outcome.
The result that the economy under laissez-faire will lead to an environmental disaster fol-
lows immediately from the facts that dirty input production Yd always grows without bound
(Proposition 1) and that a level of production of dirty input greater than (1 + ￿)￿￿1S neces-
sarily leads to a disaster next period. We thus have (proof omitted):
Proposition 2 Suppose that " > 1 and Assumption 1 holds. Then the laissez-faire equilibrium
always leads to an environmental disaster.
Remark 1 Our exposition may give the impression that dirty and clean technologies are
entirely separated. In practice, clean innovation may also reduce the environmental degradation
resulting from (partially) dirty technologies. In fact, our model implicitly allows for this
possibility. In particular, our model is equivalent to a formulation where there are no clean






























where Act and Adt correspond to the fraction of ￿tasks￿performed using clean versus dirty
technologies, and the law of motion of the environmental stock takes the form
St+1 = ￿￿ ￿ (Ydt=Yt) ￿ Yt + (1 + ￿)St;
where Ydt=Yt measures the extent to which overall production uses dirty tasks. Clean innova-
tion, increasing Act, then amounts to reducing the pollution intensity of the overall production
process. This emphasizes that our model equivalently captures technical change that reduces
the pollution from existing production processes. In addition, our main results can be easily ex-
tended to several more general formulations; for example, St+1 = ￿f (Ydt=Yt)￿Yt+(1 + ￿)St,










=Yt denotes the quantity
of dirty machines used per unit of ￿nal good production, and f is a continuously increasing
function with f(0) = 0.
We can also consider innovations reducing the global pollution rate ￿ or increasing the
regeneration rate ￿ by various geoengineering methods. Since innovations in ￿ or ￿ are pure
public goods, there would be no research directed towards them in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
This motivates our focus on technologies that might be developed by the private sector.
Finally, several di⁄erent variations of the laws of motion of the environmental stock also
yield similar results. For example, we could dispense with the upper bound on environmental
quality, so that S = 1. In this case, the results are similar, except that a disaster can be
11avoided even if dirty input production grows at a positive rate, provided that this rate is
lower than the regeneration rate of the environment, ￿. An alternative is to suppose that
St+1 = ￿￿Ydt + St + ￿, so that the regeneration of the environment is additive rather than
proportional to current quality. With this alternative law of motion, it is straightforward to
show that the results are essentially identical to the baseline formulation because a disaster
can only be avoided if Ydt does not grow at a positive exponential rate in the long run.
Proposition 2 implies that some type of intervention is necessary to avoid a disaster. For a
preliminary investigation of the implications of such intervention, suppose that the government
can subsidize scientists to work in the clean sector, for example, using a proportional pro￿t
subsidy (￿nanced through a lump-sum tax on the representative household).9 Denoting this
subsidy rate by qt, the expected pro￿t from undertaking research in the clean sector becomes




while ￿dt is still given by (16). This immediately implies that a su¢ ciently high subsidy to
clean research can redirect innovation towards the clean sector.10 Moreover, while this subsidy
is implemented, the ratio Act=Adt grows at the rate ￿￿c. When the two inputs are substitutes
(" > 1), a temporary subsidy (maintained for D periods) is su¢ cient to redirect all research to
the clean sector. More speci￿cally, while the subsidy is being implemented, the ratio Act=Adt
will increase, and when it has become su¢ ciently high, it will be pro￿table for scientists to
direct their research to the clean sector even without the subsidy.11 Equation (19) then implies
that Ydt will grow asymptotically at the same rate as A
￿+’
ct .
We say that the two inputs are strong substitutes if " ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿), or equivalently if
￿+’ ￿ 0. It follows from (19) that with strong substitutes, Ydt will not grow in the long-run.
Therefore, provided that the initial environmental quality is su¢ ciently high, a temporary
subsidy is su¢ cient to avoid an environmental disaster. This case thus delivers the most
optimistic implications of our analysis, where a temporary intervention is su¢ cient to redirect
technical change and avoid an environmental disaster without preventing long-run growth or
9The results are identical with direct subsidies to the cost of clean research or with taxes on pro￿ts in the
dirty sector.
10In particular, following the analysis in Appendix A, to implement a unique equilibrium where all scientists
direct their research to the clean sector, the subsidy rate qt must satisfy
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11The temporary tax needs to be imposed for D periods where D is the smallest integer such that:
Act+D￿1
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12even creating long-run distortions. This contrasts with the Nordhaus, the Stern/Al Gore, and
the Greenpeace answers discussed in the Introduction.
If, instead, the two inputs are weak substitutes, that is " 2 (1;1=(1 ￿ ￿)) (or ￿ + ’ > 0),
then temporary intervention will not be su¢ cient to prevent an environmental disaster. Such
an intervention can redirect all research to the clean sector, but equation (19) implies that
even after this happens, Ydt will grow at rate (1 + ￿￿c)
￿+’ ￿ 1 > 0. Intuitively, since " > 1,
as the average quality of clean machines increases, workers get reallocated towards the clean
sector (because of the market size e⁄ect). At the same time the increase of the relative price
of the dirty input over time encourages production of the dirty input (the price e⁄ect). As
shown in the previous paragraph, in the strong substitutes case the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates. In
contrast, in the weak substitutes case, where " < 1=(1￿￿), the second e⁄ect dominates,12 and
Ydt increases even though Adt is constant. In this case, we obtain the less optimistic conclusion
that a temporary subsidy redirecting research to the clean sector will not be su¢ cient to
avoid an environmental disaster; instead, similar to the Stern/Al Gore position, permanent
government regulation is necessary to avoid environmental disaster. This discussion establishes
the following proposition (proof in the text):
Proposition 3 When the two inputs are strong substitutes (" ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿)) and S is su¢ -
ciently high, a temporary subsidy to clean research will prevent an environmental disaster. In
contrast, when the two inputs are weak substitute (1 < " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), a temporary subsidy to
clean research cannot prevent an environmental disaster.
This proposition shows the importance of directed technical change: temporary incentives
are su¢ cient to redirect technical change towards clean technologies, and once clean technolo-
gies are su¢ ciently advanced, pro￿t-maximizing innovation and production will automatically
shift towards those technologies so that environmental disaster can be avoided without further
intervention.
It is also useful to note that all of the main results in this section are a consequence
of endogenous and directed technical change. Our framework would correspond to a model
without directed technical change if we instead assumed that scientists are randomly allocated
between the two sectors. Suppose, for simplicity, that this allocation is such that the qualities of
clean and dirty machines grow at the same rate (i.e., at the rate ￿e ￿ where e ￿ ￿ ￿c￿d=(￿c + ￿d)).
In this case, dirty input production will grow at the rate ￿e ￿ instead of the higher rate ￿￿d
with directed technical change. This implies that when the two inputs are strong substitutes
(" ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), under laissez-faire a disaster will occur sooner with directed technical change
12A di⁄erent intuition for the " 2 (1;1=(1 ￿ ￿)) case is that improvements in the technology of the clean
sector also correspond to improvements in the technology of the ￿nal good, which uses them as inputs; the ￿nal
good, in turn, is an input for the dirty sector because machines employed in this sector are produced using the
￿nal good; hence, technical change in the clean sector creates a force towards the expansion of the dirty sector.
13than without. But while, as we have just seen, with directed technical change a temporary
subsidy can redirect innovation towards the clean sector, without directed technical change such
redirecting is not possible and thus temporary interventions cannot prevent an environmental
disaster.
3.3 Costs of delay
Policy intervention is costly in our framework, partly because during the period of adjustment,
as productivity in the clean sector catches up with that in the dirty sector, ￿nal output increases
more slowly than the case where innovation continues to be directed towards the dirty sector.
Before studying the welfare costs of intervention in detail in Section 4, it is instructive to look
at a simple measure of the (short-run) cost of intervention, de￿ned as the number of periods
T necessary for the economy under the policy intervention to reach the same level of output
as it would have done within one period in the absence of the intervention: in other words,
this is the length of the transition period or the number of periods of ￿slow growth￿in output




















It can be veri￿ed that starting at any t ￿ 1, we have Tt ￿ 2 (in the equilibrium in
Proposition 3 and with " ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿)). Thus, once innovation is directed towards the clean
sector, it will take more than one period for the economy to achieve the same output growth
as it would have achieved in just one period in the laissez-faire equilibrium of Proposition 1
(with innovation still directed at the dirty sector). Then, recalling that ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ "),
the next corollary follows from equation (21) (proof omitted):
Corollary 1 For Adt￿1=Act￿1 ￿ 1, the short-run cost of intervention, Tt, is nondecreasing
in the technology gap Adt￿1=Act￿1 and the elasticity of substitution ". Moreover, Tt increases
more with Adt￿1=Act￿1 when " is greater.
The (short-run) cost of intervention, Tt, is increasing in Adt￿1=Act￿1 because a larger gap
between the initial quality of dirty and clean machines leads to a longer transition phase, and
thus to a longer period of slow growth. In addition, Tt is also increasing in the elasticity of
substitution ". Intuitively, if the two inputs are close substitutes, ￿nal output production relies
mostly on the more productive input, and therefore, productivity improvements in the clean
sector (taking place during the transition phase) will have less impact on overall productivity
until the clean technologies surpass the dirty ones.
The corollary shows that delaying intervention is costly, not only because of the continued
environmental degradation that will result, but also because during the period of delay Adt=Act
14will increase further, and thus when the intervention is eventually implemented, the temporary
subsidy to clean research will need to be imposed for longer and therefore there will be a
longer period of slow growth (higher T). This result is clearly related to the ￿building on
the shoulders of giants￿feature of the innovation process. Furthermore, the result that the
e⁄ects of " and Adt￿1=Act￿1 on T are complementary implies that delaying the starting date
of the intervention is more costly when the two inputs are more substitutable. These results
imply that even though for the strong substitutes case the implications of our model are more
optimistic than those of Nordhaus, it is also the case that, in contrast to the implications of
his analysis, gradual and delayed intervention would have signi￿cant costs.
Overall, the analysis in this subsection has established that a simple policy intervention
that ￿redirects￿technical change towards environment-friendly technologies can help prevent
an environmental disaster. Our analysis also highlights that delaying intervention may be quite
costly, not only because it further damages the environment (an e⁄ect already recognized in
the climate science literature), but also because it widens the gap between dirty and clean
technologies, thereby inducing a longer period of catch-up with slower growth.
3.4 Complementary inputs: " < 1
Although the case with " > 1, in fact with " ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿), is empirically more relevant, it is
useful to brie￿ y contrast these with the case where the two inputs are complements, i.e., " < 1.
Lemma 1 already established that when " < 1, innovation will favor the less advanced sector
because ’ > 0: in this case, the direct productivity e⁄ect is weaker than the combination
of the price and market size e⁄ects (which now reinforce each other). Thus, under laissez-
faire, starting from a situation where dirty technologies are initially more advanced than clean
technologies, innovations will ￿rst occur in the clean sector until that sector catches up with
the dirty sector; from then on innovation occurs in both sectors. Therefore, in the long-run,
the share of scientists devoted to the clean sector is equal to sc = ￿d=(￿c + ￿d), so that both
Act and Adt grow at the rate ￿e ￿, and Proposition 2 continues to apply (see Appendix A).
It is also straightforward to see that a temporary research subsidy to clean innovation
cannot avert an environmental disaster because it now has no impact on the long-run allocation
of scientists between the two sectors, and thus Act and Adt still grow at the rate ￿e ￿. In fact,
" < 1 implies that long-run growth is only possible if Ydt also grows without bound, which will
in turn necessarily lead to an environmental disaster. Consequently, when the two inputs are
complements (" < 1), our model delivers the pessimistic conclusion, similar to the Greenpeace
view, that environmental disaster can only be avoided if long-run growth is halted.
153.5 Direct impact of environmental on productivity
Previous studies have often used a formulation in which environmental degradation a⁄ects
productivity rather than utility. But whether it a⁄ects productivity, utility or both has little
impact on our main results. Speci￿cally, let us suppose that utility is independent of St, and








where ￿ is an increasing function of the environmental stock St, with ￿(0) = 0. This formu-
lation highlights that a reduction in environmental quality negatively a⁄ects the productivity
of labor in both sectors. It is then straightforward to establish that in the laissez-faire equi-
librium, either the productivity reduction induced by the environmental degradation resulting
from the increase in Adt occurs at a su¢ ciently high rate that aggregate output and consump-
tion converge to zero, or this productivity reduction is not su¢ ciently rapid to o⁄set the growth
in Adt and an environmental disaster occurs in ￿nite time. This result is stated in the next
proposition (and proved in Appendix B).
Proposition 4 In the laissez-faire equilibrium, the economy either reaches a disaster in ￿nite
time or consumption converges to zero over time.
With a similar logic to our baseline model, the implementation of a temporary subsidy
to clean research in this case will avoid an environmental disaster and prevent consumption
from converging to zero. It can also be shown that the short-run cost of intervention is now
smaller than in our baseline model, since the increase in environmental quality resulting from
the intervention also allows greater consumption.
4 Optimal Environmental Policy without Exhaustible Resources
We have so far studied the behavior of the laissez-faire equilibrium and discussed how envi-
ronmental disaster may be avoided. In this section, we characterize the optimal allocation of
resources in this economy and discuss how it can be decentralized using ￿carbon￿taxes and
research subsidies (we continue to focus on the case where dirty input production does not
use the exhaustible resource, i.e., ￿2 = 0). The socially optimal allocation will ￿correct￿for
two externalities: (1) the environmental externality exerted by dirty input producers, and (2)
the knowledge externalities from R&D (the fact that in the laissez-faire equilibrium scientists
do not internalize the e⁄ects of their research on productivity in the future). In addition, it
will also correct for the standard static monopoly distortion in the price of machines, encour-
aging more intensive use of existing machines (see, for example, Aghion and Howitt, 1998, or
Acemoglu, 2009). Throughout this section, we characterize a socially optimal allocation that
16can be achieved with lump-sum taxes and transfers (used for raising or redistributing revenues
as required). A key conclusion of the analysis in this section is that optimal policy must use
both a ￿carbon￿tax (i.e., a tax on dirty input production) and a subsidy to clean research,
the former to control carbon emissions and the latter to in￿ uence the path of future research.
Relying only on carbon taxes would be excessively distortionary.
4.1 The socially optimal allocation
The socially optimal allocation is a dynamic path of ￿nal good production Yt, consumption
Ct, input productions Yjt, machine productions xjit, labor allocations Ljt, scientist allocations
sjt, environmental quality St; and qualities of machines Ajit that maximizes the intertemporal
utility of the representative consumer, (1), subject to (4), (5), (7), (8), (9), (11), and (12), with
Rt ￿ 0 and ￿2 = 0. The following proposition is one of our main results.
Proposition 5 The socially optimal allocation can be implemented using a tax on dirty input
(a ￿carbon￿tax), a subsidy to clean innovation, and a subsidy for the use of all machines (all
proceeds from taxes/subsidies being redistributed/￿nanced lump-sum).
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result is intuitive in view of the fact that the socially optimal allocation must correct for
three market failures in the economy. First, the underutilization of machines due to monopoly
pricing in the laissez-faire equilibrium is corrected by a subsidy for machines. Second, the
environmental externality is corrected by introducing a wedge between the marginal product
of dirty input in the production of the ￿nal good and its shadow value￿ which corresponds to















where b pjt denotes the shadow (producer) price of input j at time t in terms of the ￿nal good (or
more formally, as shown in Appendix A, it is the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers for constraints
(5) and (4)), and ISt+1;:::;S￿<S takes value 1 if St+1;:::;S￿ < S and 0 otherwise. This tax re￿ ects
that at the optimum, the marginal cost of reducing the production of dirty input by one unit
must be equal to the resulting marginal bene￿t in terms of higher environmental quality in
all subsequent periods. Finally, the socially optimal allocation also internalizes the knowledge
externality in the innovation possibilities frontier and allocates scientists to the sector with
the higher social gain from innovation. We show in Appendix A that in the social optimum,
scientists are allocated to the clean sector whenever the ratio

















17is greater than 1. This contrasts with the decentralized outcome where scientists are allocated
according to the private value of innovation, that is, according to the ratio of the ￿rst term in
the numerator over the ￿rst term in the denominator.13
That we need both a ￿carbon￿tax and a subsidy to clean research to implement the social
optimum (in addition to the subsidy to remove the monopoly distortions) is intuitive: the sub-
sidy deals with future environmental externalities by directing innovation towards the clean
sector, whereas the carbon tax deals more directly with the current environmental externality
by reducing production of the dirty input. By reducing production in the dirty sector, the car-
bon tax also discourages innovation in that sector. However, using only the carbon tax to deal
with both current environmental externalities and future (knowledge-based) externalities will
typically necessitate a higher carbon tax, distorting current production and reducing current
consumption excessively. An important implication of this result is that, without additional
restrictions on policy, it is not optimal to rely only on a carbon tax to deal with global warm-
ing; one should also use additional instruments (R&D subsidies or a pro￿t tax on the dirty
sector) that direct innovation towards clean technologies, so that in the future production can
be increased using more productive clean technologies.
Remark 2 To elaborate on this issue, let us refer to optimal policy using both a carbon tax
and a clean research subsidy as ￿￿rst-best￿policy, and to optimal policy constrained to use only
the carbon tax as ￿second-best￿policy (in both cases subsidies to the machines are present).
Such a second-best policy might result, for example, because R&D subsidies are ine⁄ective or
their use cannot be properly monitored. Suppose ￿rst that both ￿rst-best and second-best
policies result in all scientists being always allocated to the clean sector and that the ￿rst-best
policy involves a positive clean research subsidy. In this case, we can show that the carbon tax
in the second-best policy must be higher than in the ￿rst-best policy. This simply follows from
the fact that under the second-best policy there is no direct subsidy to clean research, and thus
the carbon tax needs to be raised to indirectly ￿subsidize￿clean research. Nevertheless, when
the clean research subsidy is no longer necessary in the ￿rst-best or in cases where under either
the ￿rst-best or the second-best policies there is delay in the switch to clean research, carbon
taxes may end up being lower for some periods under the second-best policy than under the
￿rst-best policy (for example, because the switch to clean research may start later or ￿nish
earlier under the second-best).
13The knowledge externality is stark in our model because of the assumption that patents last for only one
period. Nevertheless, our qualitative results do not depend on this assumption, since, even with perfectly-
enforced in￿nite-duration patents, clean innovations create a knowledge externality for future clean innovations
because of the ￿building on the shoulders of giants￿feature of the innovation possibilities frontier.
184.2 The structure of optimal environmental regulation
In subsection 3.2, we showed that a switch to innovation in clean technologies induced by a
temporary pro￿t tax could prevent a disaster when the two inputs are substitutes. Here we
show that, when the two inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable and the discount rate is su¢ ciently
low, the optimal policy in Proposition 5 also involves a switch to clean innovation and only
temporary interventions (except for the subsidy correcting for monopoly distortions).
Proposition 6 Suppose that " > 1 and the discount rate ￿ is su¢ ciently small. Then all
innovation switches to the clean sector in ￿nite time, the economy grows asymptotically at the
rate ￿￿c and the optimal subsidy on pro￿ts in the clean sector, qt, is temporary. Moreover, if
" > 1=(1 ￿ ￿) (but not if 1 < " < 1=(1 ￿ ￿)), then the optimal carbon tax, ￿t, is temporary.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To obtain an intuition for this proposition, ￿rst note that an optimal policy requires avoid-
ing a disaster, since a disaster leads to limS#0 u(C;S) = ￿1. This in turn implies that the
production of dirty input must always remain below a ￿xed upper bound. When the discount
rate is su¢ ciently low, it is optimal to have positive long-run growth, which can be achieved
by technical change in the production of the clean input, without growth over the production
of the dirty input (because " > 1). Failing to allocate all research to clean innovation in ￿nite
time would then slow down the increase in clean input production and reduce intertemporal
welfare. An appropriately-chosen subsidy to clean research then ensures that innovation occurs
only in the clean sector, and when Act exceeds Adt by a su¢ cient amount, innovation in the
clean sector will have become su¢ ciently pro￿table that it will continue even after the subsidy
is removed (and hence there is no longer a need for the subsidy). The economy will then gener-
ate a long-run growth rate equal to the growth rate of Act, namely ￿￿c. When " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿),
the production of dirty input also decreases to 0 over time, and as a result, the environmental
stock St reaches S in ￿nite time due to positive regeneration. This in turn ensures that the
optimal carbon tax given by (23) will reach zero in ￿nite time.14
It is also straightforward to compare the structure of optimal policy in this model to the
variant without directed technical change discussed above. Since without directed technical
change the allocation of scientists is insensitive to policy, redirecting innovation towards the
clean sector is not possible. Consequently, optimal environmental regulation must prevent
an environmental disaster by imposing an ever-increasing sequence of carbon taxes. This
comparison highlights that the optimistic conclusion that optimal environmental regulation
can be achieved using temporary taxes/subsidies, and with little cost in terms of long-run
distortions and growth, is entirely due to the presence of directed technical change.








=@S > 0, the optimal carbon
tax may remain positive in the long run. Moreover, in practice the decline in carbon levels in the atmosphere
are slower than implied by our simple equation (12), necessitating a longer-lived carbon tax.
195 Equilibrium and Optimal Policy with Exhaustible Resources
In this section we characterize the equilibrium and the optimal environmental policy when
dirty input production uses the exhaustible resource (i.e., when ￿2 > 0). In particular, we
will show that the presence of an exhaustible resource may help prevent an environmental
disaster because it increases the cost of using the dirty input even without policy intervention.
Nevertheless, the major qualitative features of optimal environmental policy are similar to the
case without exhaustible resource.
In the ￿rst two subsections, we simplify the exposition by assuming that there are no
privately held property rights to the exhaustible resource. In this case, the user cost of the
exhaustible resource is determined by the cost of extraction and does not re￿ ect its scarcity
value. We then show that the main results generalize to the case in which the property rights
to the exhaustible resource are vested in in￿nite-lived ￿rms or consumers, so that the price is
determined by the Hotelling rule.
5.1 The laissez-faire equilibrium
When ￿2 > 0, the structure of equilibrium remains mostly unchanged. In particular, the
relative pro￿tability of innovation in clean and dirty sectors re￿ ects the same three e⁄ects
as before: the direct productivity e⁄ect, the price e⁄ect and the market size e⁄ect identi￿ed
above. The only change relative to the baseline model is that the resource stock now a⁄ects
the magnitude of the price and market size e⁄ects. In particular, as the resource stock declines,
the e⁄ective productivity of the dirty input also declines and its price increases, and the share
of labor allocated to the dirty sector decreases with the extraction cost. The ratio of expected
pro￿ts from research in the two sectors, which again determines the direction of equilibrium






























and ’1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ").
The main di⁄erence from the corresponding expression (18) in the case with ￿2 = 0 is
the term c(Qt)￿2("￿1) in (25). This new term, together with the assumption that c(Qt) is
decreasing in Qt, immediately implies that when the two inputs are substitutes (" > 1), as the
resource stock gets depleted, the incentives to direct innovations towards the clean sector will
increase. Intuitively, the depletion of the resource stock increases the relative cost (price) of the
dirty input, and thus reduces the market for the dirty input and encourages innovation in the
clean sector (because " > 1). In fact, it is straightforward to see that asymptotically there will
be innovation in the clean sector only (either because the extraction cost increases su¢ ciently
20rapidly, inducing all innovation to be directed at clean machines, or because the resource stock
gets fully depleted in ￿nite time). Then, again because " > 1, the dirty input is not essential to
￿nal production and therefore, provided that initial environmental quality is su¢ ciently high,
an environmental disaster can be avoided while the economy achieves positive long-run growth
at the rate ￿￿c. This discussion establishes the following proposition. (Appendix B provides a
formal proof and also analyzes the case in which " < 1).
Proposition 7 Suppose the two inputs are substitutes (" > 1). Then innovation in the long-
run will be directed towards the clean sector only and the economy will grow at rate ￿￿c.
Provided that S is su¢ ciently high, an environmental disaster is avoided under laissez-faire.
The most important result in this proposition is that when an exhaustible resource is nec-
essary for production of the dirty input, the market generates incentives for research to be
directed towards the clean sector, and these market-generated incentives may be su¢ cient for
the prevention of an environmental disaster. This contrasts with the result that an environ-
mental disaster is unavoidable under laissez-faire without the exhaustible resource. Therefore,
to the extent that in practice the increasing price of oil and the higher costs of oil extraction
will create a natural move away from dirty inputs, the implications of growth are not as dam-
aging to the environment as in the baseline case with ￿2 = 0. Nevertheless, because of the
environmental and the knowledge externalities (and also because of the failure to correctly
price the resource), the laissez-faire equilibrium is still Pareto suboptimal.
5.2 Optimal environmental regulation with exhaustible resources
We now brie￿ y discuss the structure of optimal policy in the presence of an exhaustible resource.
The socially optimal allocation maximizes (1) now subject to the constraints (4), (5), (6), (7),
(8), (9), (11), (12), and the resource constraint Qt ￿ 0 for all t.
As in Section 4, the socially optimal allocation will correct for the monopoly distortion by
subsidizing the use of machines and will again introduce a wedge between the shadow price
of the dirty input and its marginal product in the production of the ￿nal good, equivalent to
a tax on dirty input production. In addition, because the private cost of extraction is c(Qt)
(i.e., does not incorporate the scarcity value of the exhaustible resource), the socially optimal
allocation will also use a ￿resource tax￿to create a wedge between the cost of extraction and
the social value of the exhaustible resource. The next proposition summarizes the structure of
optimal policy in this case.
Proposition 8 The socially optimal allocation can be implemented using a ￿carbon￿tax (i.e.,
a tax on the use of the dirty input), a subsidy to clean research, a subsidy on the use of all
machines and a resource tax (all proceeds from taxes/subsidies being redistributed/￿nanced
lump-sum). The resource tax must be maintained forever.
21Proof. See Appendix B.
In the next section, we will also see that several quantitative features of the optimal policy
are similar in the economies with and without exhaustible resources.
5.3 Equilibrium and optimal policy under the Hotelling rule
We next investigate the implications of having well-de￿ned property rights to the exhaustible
resource vested in price-taking in￿nitely-lived pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms (see Golosov et al., 2009,
for a recent treatment of this case). This implies that the price of the exhaustible resource will
be determined by the Hotelling rule.15 In particular, let us suppose for simplicity that the cost
of extraction c(Qt) is constant and equal to c > 0. Then the price of the exhaustible resource,
Pt, has to be such that the marginal value of one additional unit of extraction today must be
equal to the discounted value of an additional unit extracted tomorrow. More formally, the
Hotelling rule in this case takes the form
@u(Ct;St)
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(Pt+1 ￿ c): (26)
We further simplify the analysis by assuming a constant coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion






where ￿0 > 0 and ￿00 < 0. Then the Hotelling rule, (26), implies that the price Pt of the
resource must asymptotically grow at the interest rate r, given from the consumption Euler
as:
r = (1 + ￿)(1 + g)
￿ ￿ 1; (27)
where g is the asymptotic growth rate of consumption.
The next proposition shows that relative to the case analyzed in the previous two sub-
sections, avoiding an environmental disaster becomes more di¢ cult when the price of the
exhaustible resource is given by the Hotelling rule.
Proposition 9 If the discount rate ￿ and the elasticity of substitution " are both su¢ ciently
high (in particular, if ln(1 + ￿) > [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿ max(￿d;￿c)) and " > 1=(2 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿)),
then innovation asymptotically occurs in the clean sector only and a disaster is avoided un-
der laissez-faire provided that the initial environmental quality, S, is su¢ ciently high. How-
ever, if the discount rate and the elasticity of substitution are su¢ ciently low (in particular, if
ln(1 + ￿) < (1=" ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2￿)ln(1 + ￿￿c)=￿2 and ln(1 + ￿) 6= (1 ￿ ￿1)ln(1 + ￿￿d)=￿2),
then a disaster cannot be avoided under laissez-faire.
15Yet another alternative would be to have the exhaustible resource owned by a single entity (or consortium),
which would not only choose its price according to its scarcity but would also attempt to deviate from the
Hotelling rule to internalize the environmental externalities. We ￿nd this case empirically less relevant and do
not focus on it.
22Proof. See Appendix B.
Intuitively, if the price of the resource Pt increases more slowly over time than productivity
in the dirty sector, Adt, then under laissez-faire, innovation continues to take place in the dirty
sector forever and the growth in the production of the dirty input leads to an environmental
disaster. This case arises when the discount rate ￿ is su¢ ciently small. An environmental
disaster can only be avoided if the price Pt increases su¢ ciently fast so that in ￿nite time
innovation shifts entirely to the clean sector. This in turn requires that the discount rate ￿
be su¢ ciently high. However, for the same reasons as those highlighted in Section 3, such a
switch is not su¢ cient to avoid an environmental disaster unless clean and dirty sectors are
￿strong substitutes,￿which now corresponds to the case where " > 1=(2 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿).
It can also be shown that a temporary research subsidy is now su¢ cient to avoid a dis-
aster when " > 1=[1 ￿ ￿ + ￿2 (ln(1 + ￿)=ln(1 + ￿￿c) + ￿)]. This threshold is lower than
the corresponding threshold 1=(1 ￿ ￿) in the case without the exhaustible resource because
dirty inputs are now using the exhaustible resource, which has a price growing at the rate
(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿￿c)
￿ ￿ 1. This is also the reason why this threshold is decreasing in the share
of the exhaustible resource in the production of dirty input. Finally, one can show that the
optimal policy is identical to that characterized in subsection 5.2, except that the resource tax
is no longer necessary.
6 Quantitative Evaluation
In this section, we report the results of a ￿rst quantitative evaluation of the economic forces
introduced in this paper. We start with the economy without exhaustible resources (i.e., ￿2 =
0). We then brie￿ y discuss the economy with an exhaustible resource. Our objective is not to
provide a comprehensive quantitative evaluation, but to highlight the e⁄ects of di⁄erent values
of the discount rate and the elasticity of substitution on the form of optimal environmental
regulation and the resulting timing of a switch (of R&D and production) to clean technology.
To highlight the new implications of directed technical change, we choose the parameters to
make our exercise as similar to existing quantitative analyses as possible.
We take a period in our model to correspond to 5 years. We set ￿c = ￿d = 0:02 (per
annum) and ￿ = 1 so that the long-run annual growth rate is equal to 2% (which matches
Nordhaus￿assumptions in his 2007 DICE calibration). We take ￿ = 1=3 (so that the share of
national income spent on machines is approximately equal to the share of capital). We suppose
that before the implementation of the optimal policy the carbon tax is set at 0. But to focus
on the implications of the environmental externality, we assume that the subsidy to machines
is present throughout. We compute Act￿1 and Adt￿1 to match the implied values of Yct￿1 and
Ydt￿1 to the production of nonfossil and fossil fuel in the world primary energy supply from
2002 to 2006 (according to the Energy Information Administration data). Note that in all our
23exercises, when " varies, Act￿1 and Adt￿1 also need to be adjusted (in particular, a higher "
leads to a higher ratio of Act￿1=Adt￿1).
Estimating the economy-wide elasticity of substitution is beyond the scope of the current
paper. We simply note that since fossil and nonfossil fuels should be close substitutes (at the
very least, once nonfossil fuels can be transported e¢ ciently), reasonable values of " should be
quite high. Throughout the following calibration exercise, we consider two di⁄erent values for
": a low value of " = 3 and a high value of " = 10. Contrasting what happens under these two
values will allow us to highlight the crucial role of the elasticity of substitution in determining
the form of the optimal policy.
6.1 Parameter choices
To relate the environmental quality variable S to the atmospheric concentration of carbon,
we use a common approximation to the relationship between the increase in temperature
since preindustrial times (in degrees Celsius), ￿, and the atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide (in ppm), CCO2: ￿ ’ 3log2 (CCO2=280). This equation implies that a doubling of
atmospheric concentration in CO2 (since preindustrial times, when the concentration was equal
to 280 ppm) leads to a 3￿C increase in current temperature (see, e.g., Pachauri et al., 2007).
We then express S as a decreasing function of ￿ and thus of CCO2, so that S = 0 corresponds
to a level of temperature change ￿ approximating ￿disaster temperature,￿￿disaster (described
below). More speci￿cally, we set
S = 280 ￿ 2￿disaster=3 ￿ maxfCCO2;280g:
Furthermore, we now relax the assumption that S0 = S and set the initial environmental
quality S0 to correspond to the current atmospheric concentration of 379 ppm (S, in turn,
corresponds to CCO2 = 280 ppm, the preindustrial value).
We then estimate parameter ￿ from the observed value of Yd and the annual emission of
CO2 (￿Yd in our model) between 2002 and 2006 according to the Energy Information Admin-
istration. Finally, we choose ￿ such that only half of the amount of emitted carbon contributes
to increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (the rest being o⁄set by ￿environmental
regeneration,￿see again Pachauri et al., 2007).
Nordhaus￿ and much of the literature following his work￿ assumes that environmental
quality a⁄ects aggregate productivity. We ￿nd it more reasonable that high temperature levels
and high concentrations of carbon dioxide a⁄ect utility as well as production, and we formulated
our model under the assumption that environmental quality directly a⁄ects utility. To highlight
the similarities and the di⁄erences between our model and existing quantitative models with
exogenous technology, we choose the parameters such that the welfare consequences of changes
in temperature (for the range of changes observed so far) are the same in our model as in






with ￿ = 2, which matches Nordhaus￿ s choice of intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In
addition, this utility function contains the term ￿(S) for the costs from the degradation of
environmental quality. We choose this function as
￿(S) = ’(￿(S)) ￿
(￿disaster ￿ ￿(S))
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿1




with ￿disaster = 6:9￿C, and matching this function with Nordhaus￿ s damage function over the
range of temperature increases up to 3￿C leads to a value of ￿ = 0:3492:16
6.2 Results
The debate between Stern and Nordhaus highlighted the importance of the discount rate when
determining the optimal environmental policy. Here we consider two di⁄erent values for the
discount rate: the Stern discount rate of 0:001 per annum (which we write as ￿ = 0:001), and
the Nordhaus discount rate of 0:015 per annum (￿ = 0:015, which, as in Nordhaus, corresponds
to an annual long-run interest rate of about r = ￿ + ￿g = 5:5%).
Figure 1 shows the subsidy to the clean sector, the allocation of scientists to clean tech-
nologies, the ￿carbon￿tax, the share of clean inputs in total production, and the increase in
temperature in the optimal allocation for di⁄erent values of " and ￿.
This ￿gure shows very similar patterns for ￿ = 0:015 and ￿ = 0:01 when " = 10. In fact,
the blue and green curves referring to these two cases are not distinguishable in the ￿gure.
Figure 1B shows that when " = 10 or when " = 3 and ￿ = 0:001, the optimal policy involves
an immediate switch of all research activities toward clean technologies. When " = 3 and
￿ = 0:015, the switch towards clean research occurs around year 50. As shown in Figure 1A,
the optimal subsidy to clean research is temporary, and it is lower and of shorter duration when
" = 10, because in this case the initial gap between clean and dirty technologies consistent
16’ is a strictly decreasing and concave function, with ’(0) = 1, ’(￿disaster) = 0, ’




0(￿) = ￿1. This functional form ensures that our assumptions on the utility function, (2) and
(3), are satis￿ed. Note that (29) de￿nes a ￿ exible family of continuous functions parameterized by ￿. As
￿ ! 1, this function converges to ’1(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿=￿disaster)(1 ￿ ln(1 ￿ ￿=￿disaster)) for all ￿ 2 [0;￿disaster)
(from L￿Hopital￿ s rule) and ’1(￿disaster) = 0, and as ￿ ! 1, it converges (pointwise) to the ￿step function￿
’0(￿) = 1 for all ￿ 2 [0;￿disaster) and ’0(￿) = 0 for ￿ = ￿disaster. The value ￿disaster = 6:9
￿C corresponds
to 1.5 times the highest estimate of the temperature increase that would eventually lead to the melting of the
Greenland Ice Sheet (Pachauri et al., 2007). In Nordhaus￿ s DICE model, output is a⁄ected by temperature
through a multiplicative term ￿(￿) =
￿
1 + 0:0028388￿
2￿￿1 in the aggregate production function. We compute
the parameter ￿ so as to match our function ’ with ￿ over the range of temperature increases up to 3
￿C (more
precisely, we minimize the L
2-norm of the di⁄erence ￿￿’ on the interval [0;3]). With this choice of ’ function,
our model generates e⁄ects that are very close to those obtained in Nordhaus￿ s calibration exercises for increases
in temperature less than 3
￿C.
25Figure 1: Optimal environmental policy for di⁄erent values of " and ￿
with the observed share of dirty inputs is smaller. When " = 3, the optimal subsidy is larger
and lasts longer, particularly when ￿ = 0:015, because in this case the switch to clean research
occurs later.
Figure 1C shows that when " = 10, there is only a very low of carbon tax for a limited
period because the rapid switch to clean inputs makes this tax unnecessary.17 Again, in
contrast, when " = 3 and ￿ = 0:015, because the switch of both innovation and production to
the clean sector is delayed, there is a much higher and initially (for over 250 years) increasing
carbon tax. Figure 1D shows that when " = 10, the clean sector takes over most of input
production quite rapidly (it takes 30 years only for 90% of input production to switch to the
clean sector). In contrast, when " = 3 and ￿ = 0:001, even though the switch to clean research
is immediate, it takes much longer (for over 150 years) for 90% of inputs to be supplied by
17This result should be interpreted with caution. For example, if we introduce restrictions on research subsidies
or allow them to be less than fully e⁄ective, then there would be a greater role for the carbon tax.
26the clean sector. Figure 1E shows that when " = 10, there is a small increase, followed by
a decrease, in temperature (going back to its preindustrial level after about 90 years). The
pattern is similar, though the increase and the subsequent decline are more protracted when
" = 3 and ￿ = 0:001. Finally, when " = 3 and ￿ = 0:015, temperature keeps increasing for
about 250 years before reaching a maximum fairly close to the disaster level.
Overall, the above exercise suggests that if the elasticity of substitution between clean and
dirty inputs is su¢ ciently high, then whether one uses the Nordhaus or the Stern discount rate
has little bearing on the nature of the optimal environmental policy.
Corollary 1 in subsection 3.3 related the costs of delayed intervention to the number of
additional periods of slow growth that such a delay would induce. Table 1 here shows the
welfare costs of delaying the implementation of the optimal policy (i.e., of maintaining the
clean innovation subsidy and the carbon tax at zero for a while before implementing the
optimal policy).18 Welfare costs are measured as the equivalent percentage reduction in per
period consumption relative to the allocation with immediate intervention (we assume that
when intervention starts, it takes the optimal form). The numbers in the table correspond to
di⁄erent values of the elasticity of substitution " (with the initial value Act￿1 and Adt￿1 being
adjusted accordingly), the discount rate ￿ and the amount of delay. The table shows that
delay costs can be substantial. For example, with " = 10 and ￿ = 0:001, a 10 year delay is
equivalent to a 14.02% decline in consumption (when ￿ = 0:015, the corresponding number is
1.92%). Moreover, the cost of delay increases with the duration of the delay and the elasticity
of substitution between the two inputs. Intuitively, when the two inputs are close substitutes,
further advances in the dirty technology that occur before the optimal policy is implemented
do not contribute much to aggregate ouput once the switch to clean research and production
takes place. The cost of delay also decreases with the discount rate because the bene￿t from
delaying intervention, due to higher consumption early on, increases with the discount rate.
It is also noteworthy that the variations in the delay cost resulting from changes in " and ￿
are of the same order of magnitude. This suggests that the elasticity of substitution between
clean and dirty input is as important a consideration as the discount rate when assessing the
costs of delaying intervention.
Table 1: Welfare costs of delayed intervention as a function of the elasticity of
substitution and the discount rate
(Percentage reductions in consumption relative to immediate intervention)
Elasticity of substitution " 10 3
Discount rate ￿ 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.015
delay = 10 years 8:75 1:87 2:71 0:05
delay = 20 years 14:02 1:92 4:79 0:12
delay = 30 years 17:65 1:99 6:88 0:23
18The optimal subsidy on machines is maintained during the period of delay.
27Finally, we brie￿ y discuss the welfare costs of relying solely on a carbon (input) tax instead
of combining it with the subsidy to clean research (i.e., the ￿second-best￿instead of ￿￿rst-best￿
derived in Proposition 6). Without the subsidy to clean research, the carbon tax needs to be
signi￿cantly higher. For example, when " = 10 and ￿ = 0:015, the initial value of the carbon
tax in the second-best needs to be 20 times higher than in the ￿rst-best. The higher tax level
creates a greater reduction in production and consumption in the short run. Table 2 shows
that the welfare loss in the second-best relative to the ￿rst-best can be signi￿cant (though it
is typically smaller than the costs of delay shown in Table 1). It is smaller when the elasticity
of substitution is high, since in this case a relatively small carbon tax is su¢ cient to redirect
R&D towards clean technologies; and it is greater when the discount rate is high, because a
higher discount rate puts a higher weight on earlier periods where a signi￿cantly higher carbon
tax needs to be imposed in the second-best.
Table 2: Welfare costs of relying solely on carbon tax as a function of the
elasticity of substitution and the discount rate
(Percentage reductions in consumption relative to the optimal policy)
Elasticity of substitution " 10 3
Discount rate ￿ 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.015
Welfare cost 0:95 1:58 1:74 2:70
6.3 Optimal policies with exhaustible resources
In Appendix B, we report the quantitative results for the version of the model with an ex-
haustible resource. Figure 2 in Appendix B shows that the implied path of optimal policy
is remarkably similar to the case without an exhaustible resource. We again ￿nd that when
" = 10 or when " = 3 and ￿ = 0:001, the switch to clean innovation is immediate. When
" = 3 and ￿ = 0:015, the switch to clean innovation is again delayed and takes slightly more
than 50 years. The behavior of temperature and taxes in all cases is very similar to Figure 1
(but we can see that when the switch to clean innovation is immediate, production switches
faster towards the clean sector because of the cost of the exhaustible resource). Intuitively,
the similarity is due to the fact that optimal policy does not run up against the exhaustibility
constraint.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced endogenous and directed technical change in a growth model with
environmental constraints and limited resources. We characterized the structure of equilibria
and the dynamic tax/subsidy policies that achieve sustainable growth or maximize intertem-
poral welfare. The long-run properties of both the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social
28optimum (or the necessary policies to avoid environmental disaster) are related to the degree
of substitutability between clean and dirty inputs, to whether dirty input production uses
exhaustible resources, and to initial environmental and resource stocks.
The main implications of factoring in the importance of directed technical change are as
follows: (i) when the inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable, sustainable long-run growth can be
achieved using temporary policy intervention (e.g., a temporary research subsidy to the clean
sector), and need not involve long-run distortions; (ii) optimal policy involves both ￿carbon
taxes￿and research subsidies, so that excessive use of carbon taxes can be avoided; (iii) delay in
intervention is costly: the sooner and the stronger the policy response, the shorter will the slow
growth transition phase be; (iv) the use of an exhaustible resource in dirty input production
helps the switch to clean innovation under laissez-faire. Thus the response of technology to
policy leads to a more optimistic scenario than what emerges from models with exogenous
technology. However, directed technical change also calls for immediate and decisive action in
contrast to the implications of several exogenous technology models used in previous economic
analyses.
A simple quantitative evaluation suggests that, provided that the elasticity of substitution
between clean and dirty inputs is su¢ ciently high, optimal environmental regulation should
involve an immediate switch of R&D resources to clean technology, followed by a gradual
switch of all production to clean inputs. This conclusion appears robust to the range of
discount rates used in the Stern report and in Nordhaus￿ s work (which lead to very di⁄erent
policy conclusions in models with exogenous technology). Interestingly, in most cases, optimal
environmental regulation involves small carbon taxes because research subsidies are able to
redirect innovation to clean technologies before there is more extensive environmental damage.
Our paper is a ￿rst step towards a comprehensive framework that can be used for theoretical
and quantitative analysis of environmental regulation with endogenous technology. Several
directions of future research appear fruitful. First, it would be useful to develop a multi-
country model with endogenous technology and environmental constraints, which can be used
to discuss issues of global policy coordination and the degree to which international trade
should be linked to environmental policies. Second, an interesting direction is to incorporate
￿environmental risk￿ into this framework, for example, because of the ex ante uncertainty
on the regeneration rate, ￿, or on future costs of environmental damage. Another line of
important future research would be to exploit macroeconomic and microeconomic (￿rm- and
industry-level) data to estimate the relevant elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty
inputs.
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Solving for the laissez-faire equilibrium
In this Appendix we solve for the pro￿t-maximization of machine producers, and express the
price and labor allocation ratio as a function of the relative aggregate productivities of clean
and dirty technologies in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
The pro￿t-maximization problem of the producer of machine i at time t in sector j 2 fc;dg
























The monopolist producer of machine i in sector j chooses pjit and xjit to maximize pro￿ts
￿jit = (pjit ￿  )xjit, subject to the inverse demand curve (A.30). Given this iso-elastic de-
mand, the pro￿t-maximizing price is a constant markup over marginal cost, thus pjit =  =￿.
Recalling the normalization   ￿ ￿2, this implies that pjit = ￿ and thus the equilibrium demand





Equilibrium pro￿ts for the monopolist are then given by (15) in the text.

















This equation formalizes the natural idea that the input produced with more productive ma-
chines will be relatively cheaper.




Combining (A.33) with (13), then using (A.32) and the de￿nition of ’ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ "),

















Finally, combining (A.32) and (A.34) with (17) gives (18) in the text.
30Equilibrium allocations of scientists
We now characterize the equilibrium allocation(s) of innovation e⁄ort across the two sectors












for s 2 [0;1], we can rewrite (18) as ￿ct=￿dt = f (sct). Clearly, if f(1) > 1, then s = 1 is
an equilibrium; if f(0) < 1, then s = 0 is an equilibrium; and ￿nally if f(s￿) = 1 for some
s￿ 2 (0;1), then s￿ is an equilibrium. Given these observations, we have:
1. If 1 + ’ > 0 (or equivalently " < (2 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿)), then f(s) is strictly decreasing in
s: Then it immediately follows that: (i) if f(1) > 1, then s = 1 is the unique equilibrium (we
only have a corner solution in that case); (ii) if f(0) < 1, then s = 0 is the unique equilibrium
(again a corner solution); (iii) if f(0) > 1 > f(1), then by continuity there exists a unique
s￿ 2 (0;1) such that f(s￿) = 1, which is the unique (interior) equilibrium.
2. If 1+’ < 0 (or equivalently " > (2￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿)), then f(s) is strictly increasing in s: In
that case: (i) if 1 < f(0) < f(1); then s = 1 is the unique equilibrium; (ii) if f(0) < f(1) < 1;
then s = 0 is the unique equilibrium; (iii) if f(0) < 1 < f(1); then there are three equilibria,
an interior one s = s￿ 2 (0;1) where s￿ is such that f(s￿) = 1, s = 0 and s = 1.
3. If 1+’ = 0; then f(s) ￿ f is a constant. If f is greater than 1, then s = 1 is the unique
equilibrium; if it is less than one, then s = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
This characterizes the allocation of scientists and implies the results in Lemma 1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1
Assumption 1 together with the characterization of equilibrium allocation of scientists above
implies that initially innovation will occurs in the dirty sector only (sdt = 1 and sct = 0). From
(11), this widens the gap between clean and dirty technologies and ensures that sdt+1 = 1
and sct+1 = 0, and so on in subsequent periods. This shows that under Assumption 1, the
equilibrium is uniquely de￿ned under laissez-faire and involves sdt = 1 and sct = 0 for all t. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5
Let ￿t denote the Lagrange multiplier for (4), which is naturally also the shadow value of one
unit of ￿nal good production. The ￿rst-order condition with respect to Yt imply that this
shadow value is also equal to the Lagrange multiplier for (8), so that it is also equal to the









so that the shadow value of the ￿nal good is equal to the marginal utility of consumption.
31Next, letting !t denote the Lagrange multiplier for the environmental equation (12), the







+ (1 + ￿)ISt<S!t+1; (A.36)
where ISt<S is equal to 1 if St < S and to 0 otherwise. This implies that the shadow value of
environmental quality at time t is equal to the marginal utility that it generates in this period
plus the shadow value of (1 + ￿) units of environmental quality at time t + 1 (as one unit of
environmental quality at time t generates 1+￿ units at time t+1). Solving (A.36) recursively,
















=@S = 0, this equation also implies that if for all ￿ > T, S￿ = S, then !t = 0 for all
t > T.
De￿ning ￿jt as the Lagrange multiplier for (5), the ratio ￿jt=￿t can be interpreted as the
shadow price of input j at time t (relative to the price of the ￿nal good). To emphasize this
interpretation, we will denote this ratio by b pjt. The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to Yct
































￿t = b pdt:
(A.38)
These equations imply that compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium, the social planner intro-
duces a wedge of !t+1￿=￿t between the marginal product of the dirty input in the production
and its price. This wedge !t+1￿=￿t is equal to the environmental cost of an additional unit of
the dirty input (evaluated in terms of units of the ￿nal good at time t; recall that one unit of
dirty production at time t destroys ￿ units of environmental quality at time t + 1). Naturally,





on the use of dirty input by the ￿nal good producer. This tax rate will be higher when the
shadow value of environmental quality is greater, when the marginal utility of consumption
today is lower, and when the price of dirty input is lower. Plugging (A.37) and (A.35) in (A.39)
we get (23).
Next, the subsidy to the use of all machines can be derived from the ￿rst-order condition









32Comparing this expression to the equilibrium inverse demand, (A.30) highlights that existing
machines will be used more intensively in the socially-planned allocation. This is a natural
consequence of the monopoly distortions and can also be interpreted as the socially-planned
allocation involving a subsidy of 1 ￿ ￿ in the use of machines, so that their price should be
identical to the marginal cost, i.e., (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) =￿ =   ￿ ￿2.









so that for given price, average technology and labor allocation, the production of each input
is scaled up by a factor ￿
￿￿
1￿￿ compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium (this results from the
more intensive use of machines in the socially-planned allocation).
Finally, the socially optimal allocation must correct for the knowledge externality. Let ￿jt
denote the Lagrange multiplier for equation (11) for j = c;d (corresponding to the shadow















Intuitively, the shadow value of a unit increase in average productivity in sector j 2 fc;dg is




(the number of units of productivity created out of it at time t + 1). This last
term captures the intertemporal knowledge externality.
At the optimum, scientists will be allocated towards the sector with the higher social gain
from innovation, as measured by ￿￿j￿jtAjt￿1. Using (A.42), we then have that the social
planner will allocate scientists to the clean sector whenever the ratio















is greater than 1 (combining (A.35) and (A.43) we obtain (24)) The social planner can imple-
ment the optimal allocation through a subsidy qt to clean research. To determine this subsidy,








Then, using (A.38), (A.41) and (A.44), we obtain:
Lct
Ldt
















given subsidy qt, the ratio of expected pro￿ts from innovation in sectors c and d, the equivalent
of (18) in the text, can be written as
￿ct
￿dt














Clearly, when the optimal allocation involves sct = 1, we can can choose qt to make this
expression greater than one. Or more explicitly, we can set











When the optimal allocation involves sct 2 (0;1), then setting qt to ensure that ￿ct=￿dt = 1
achieves the desired objective. ￿
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36Appendix B: Omitted Proofs and Further Details (Not for Pub-
lication)
Allocation of scientists in laissez-faire equilibrium when the inputs are com-
plementary (" < 1)
Proposition 10 Under Assumption 1 and if " < 1, there is a unique equilibrium in laissez-
faire where innovation ￿rst occurs in the clean sector, then occurs in both sectors, and asymp-
totically the share of scientists devoted to the clean sector is given by sc = ￿d=(￿c + ￿d); the
long-run growth rate of dirty input production in this case is ￿e ￿, where e ￿ ￿ ￿c￿d=(￿c + ￿d).
This proposition is proved using the following lemma:
Lemma 2 When " < 1, long-run equilibrium innovation will be in both sectors, so that the
equilibrium share of scientists in the clean sector converges to sc = ￿d=(￿c + ￿d).
Proof. Suppose that at time t innovation occurred in both sectors so that ￿ct=￿dt = 1.












Innovation will therefore occur in both sectors at time t+1 whenever the equilibrium allocation










This equation de￿nes sct+1(= 1 ￿ sdt+1) as a function of sct(= 1 ￿ sdt). We next claim that
this equation has an interior solution sct+1 2 (0;1) when sct2 (0;1) (i.e., when sct is itself
interior). First, note that when ’ > 0 (that is, " < 1), the function z(x) = x1=(’+1) ￿ x is
strictly decreasing for x < 1 and strictly increasing for x > 1. Therefore, x = 1 is the unique






1 + ￿￿d(1 ￿ sct)
;
is a one-to-one mapping from (0;1) onto ((1 + ￿￿d)
￿1 ;1 + ￿￿c). Finally, it can be veri￿ed
that whenever X 2 ((1 + ￿￿d)
￿1 ;1 + ￿￿c), we also have X1=(’+1)2 ((1 + ￿￿d)
￿1 ;1 + ￿￿c).
This, together with (B.1), implies that if sct 2 (0;1), then sct+1 = X￿1(X(sct)1=(’+1)) 2 (0;1),
proving the claim at the beginning of this paragraph.
From Appendix A, when ’ > 0; the equilibrium allocation of scientists is unique at each
t. Thus as t ! 1, this allocation must converge to the unique ￿xed point of the function







B-1This completes the proof of the lemma.
Now given the characterization of the equilibrium allocations of scientists in Appendix
A, under Assumption 1 the equilibrium involves sdt = 0 and sct = 1, i.e., innovation occurs
initially in the clean sector only. From (11), Act=Adt will grow at a rate ￿￿c, and in ￿nite time,
it will exceed the threshold (1 + ￿￿c)
￿(’+1)=’ (￿c=￿d)
1=’. Lemma 2 implies that when this










equilibrium innovation occurs in both sectors, i.e., sdt > 0 and sct > 0, and from this point
onwards, innovation will occur in both sectors and the share of scientists devoted to the clean
sector converges to ￿d=(￿d + ￿c). This completes the proof of Proposition 10.
Speed of disaster in laissez-faire






















When the two inputs are gross substitutes (" < 1), we have ’ = ’su < 0; whereas when they
are complements (" > 1), we have ’ = ’co > 0 . Since all innovations occur in the dirty sector
in the substitutability case, but not in the complementarity case, if we start with the same







kt denote the average productivities in sector k at time t respectively in the









































































+1 > Y co
dt:
Repeating the same argument for t + 1, t + 2,..., we have that Y su
dt > Y co
dt for all t. This
establishes that, under Assumption 1, there will be a greater amount of dirty input production
for each t when " > 1 than when " < 1, implying that an environmental disaster will occur
sooner when the two sectors are gross substitutes.
B-2Proof of Proposition 4


























In particular, as in Section 3, under laissez-faire all technological progress keeps being di-
rected towards dirty innovation, therefore Adt grows to in￿nity. Then, a necessary condition for
avoiding a disaster under laissez-faire is that Ydt remains bounded above over time, which can
only be the case if ￿(St)
1=(1￿￿) Adt also remains bounded. Since Adt is growing exponentially,
this is only possible if St converges to 0. Now, suppose that ￿(St)
1=(1￿￿) Adt converges to a
￿nite and positive value as time t goes to in￿nity. Then there exists a constant ￿ such that for
any T there is a ￿ > T such that ￿(S￿)
1=(1￿￿) Ad￿ > ￿=￿: But for ￿ > T su¢ ciently high, we
also have
￿
￿ ￿Yd￿ ￿ ￿(S￿)
1=(1￿￿) Ad￿
￿
￿ ￿ < ￿=(3￿) since Ydt ’ ￿(St)
1=(1￿￿) Adt asymptotically, and
(1 + ￿)S￿ < ￿=3 since St converges to 0. But then (12) gives S￿+1 = 0, which corresponds to
an environmental disaster. Consequently, to avoid a disaster under laissez-faire, it must be the
case that ￿(St)
1=(1￿￿) Adt converges to 0. But this implies that Yt converges to 0 as well, and
so does Ct. ￿
B.1 Proof of Proposition 6
First we need to derive the optimal production of inputs given technologies and the tax imple-
mented. Using (A.38) and (A.39), the shadow values of clean and dirty inputs satisfy
b p1￿"
ct + (b pdt (1 + ￿t))
1￿" = 1: (B.2)











































































Equation (B.5) implies that the production of dirty input is decreasing in ￿t. Moreover,
clearly as ￿t ! 1, we have Ydt ! 0.
B-3We next characterize the behavior of this tax rate and the research subsidy, qt. Recall that
to avoid an environmental disaster, the optimal policy must always ensure that Ydt remained
bounded, in particular, Ydt ￿ (1 + ￿)S=￿.
Assume " > 1. The proof consists of six parts: (1) We show that, for a discount rate ￿
su¢ ciently low, the optimal allocation cannot feature a bounded Yct, thus Yct must become
unbounded as t goes to in￿nity. (2) We show that this implies that Act must tend towards
in￿nity. (3) We show that if the optimal allocation involves Yct unbounded (i.e limsupYct =
1), then it must be the case that at the optimum Yct ! 1 as t goes to in￿nity. (4) We prove
that the economy switches towards clean research, that is, sct ! 1. (5) We prove that the
switch in research to clean technologies occurs in ￿nite time, that is, there exists ~ T such that
sct = 1 for all t ￿ ~ T. (6) We then derive the implied behavior of ￿t and qt.
Part 1: To obtain a contradiction, suppose that the optimal allocation features Yct remain-
ing bounded as t goes to in￿nity. If Ydt was unbounded, then there would be an environ-
mental disaster, but then the allocation could not be optimal in view of the assumption that
limS#0 u(C;S) = ￿1 (equation (2)). Thus Ydt must also remain bounded as t goes to in￿nity.
But if both Yct and Ydt remain bounded, so will Yt and Ct. We use the superscript ns (ns for
￿no switch￿ ) to denote the variables under this allocation.
Consider an alternative (feasible) allocation, featuring all research being directed to clean
technologies after some date ^ t, i.e., sct = 1 for all t > ^ t and no production of dirty input (by
taking an in￿nite carbon tax ￿t). This in turn implies that St reaches S in ￿nite time because
of regeneration at the rate ￿ in (12). Moreover, (B.4) implies that Yt=Act ! constant and
thus Ct=Act ! constant. Let us use superscript a to denote all variables under this alternative
allocation. Then there exists a consumption level C < 1, and a date T < 1 such that for
t ￿ T, Cns
t < C, Ca
t >C + ￿ (where ￿ > 0) and Sa
t = S. Now using the fact that u is strictly
increasing in C and S, for all t ￿ T we have
u(Ca
t ;Sa
t ) ￿ u(Cns
t ;Sns










which is positive and strictly increasing over time. Then the welfare di⁄erence between the
alternative and the no-switch allocations can be written as
















































Since the utility function is continuous in C, and Cns
t is ￿nite for all t < T (for all ￿), then as ￿
decreases the ￿rst term remains bounded above by a constant, while the second term tends to
in￿nity. This establishes that Wa ￿ Wns > 0 for ￿ su¢ ciently small, yielding a contradiction
and establishing that we must have Yct unbounded when t goes to in￿nity.
B-4Part 2: Now (B.4) directly implies that
















where M is an upper-bound on Ydt. g is an increasing function and limsupYct = 1, so
limsupAct = 1 and as Act is weakly increasing, limAct = 1.
Part 3: Now suppose by contradiction that liminf Yct 6= 1, then by de￿nition if must be
the case that 9M0 such that 8T, 9t > T with Yct < M0. Let us consider such an M0 and note
that we can always choose it to be higher than the upper bound on Ydt. Then we can de￿ne
a subsequence tn with tn ￿ n and Yctn < M0 for all n: Since Ydt < M0 as well, we have that
for all n: Ctn < Ytn < 2"=("￿1)M0. Moreover, since limt!1 Act = 1, there exists an integer ￿
such that for any t > ￿, Act > (￿= )
￿￿=(1￿￿) 2"=("￿1)M0=(1 ￿ ￿). Consequently, for n ￿ ￿ we
have: Ctn < Ytn < 2"=("￿1)M0 and Actn > (￿= )
￿￿=(1￿￿) 2"=("￿1)M0=(1 ￿ ￿).
Consider now the alternative policy that mimics the initial policy, except that in all periods
tn for n ￿ ￿ the social planner chooses the carbon tax ￿a
tn to be su¢ ciently large (the super-
script a designates ￿alternative￿ ) that Y a
dtn = 0: Then we have: Y a
tn = Y a
ctn = (￿= )
￿=(1￿￿) Actn;
which yields Sa
t ￿ St for all t ￿ tn since the alternative policy either reduces or maintains dirty
input production relative to the original policy. Moreover, we have: Ca
tn = (1 ￿ ￿)Y a
tn ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿= )
￿=(1￿￿) Actn > 2"=("￿1)M0 > Ctn; whereas consumption in periods t 6= tn remains
unchanged. Thus the alternative policy leads to (weakly) higher consumption and environ-
mental quality in all periods, and to strictly higher consumption in periods t = tn; thus overall
to strictly higher welfare, than the original policy. Hence the original policy is not optimal,
using a contradiction. This in turn establishes that on the optimal path liminf Yct = 1 and
therefore limYct = 1:
Part 4: From Part 3 we know that on the optimal path Yct=Ydt ! 1, that is (1 + ￿t)
1￿" (Act=Adt)
’ !






























Since (1 + ￿t)(Act=Adt)











Now by contradiction let us suppose that liminf sct = s < 1:Then for any ~ T there exists ￿ >
~ T, such that sc￿ < (1+s)=2. Now, as lim(Ct=Act) = (￿= )
￿=(1￿￿) (1 ￿ ￿), there exists some T
such that for any t > T, we have Ct < (￿= )
￿=(1￿￿) (1 ￿ ￿)Act (1 + ￿￿c)=(1 + ￿￿c (1 + s)=2):
B-5Then take ￿ su￿iciently large that ￿ > T and sc￿ < (1 + s)=2; and consider the following
alternative policy: the alternative policy is identical to the original policy up to time ￿￿1, then
at ￿, the alternative policy allocates all research to the clean sector, and for t > ￿, the allocation
of research is identical to the original policy, and for t ￿ ￿, the carbon tax is in￿nite. Then
under the alternative policy, there is no pollution for t ￿ ￿ so the quality of the environment is
weakly better than under the original policy. Moreover: Aa
ct = (1 + ￿￿c)Act=(1 + ￿￿csc￿), for































so that the alternative policy brings higher welfare. This in turn contradicts the optimality of






































































Now, suppose that sct does not reach 1 in ￿nite time. Then for any T, there exists ￿ > T,
such that sc￿ < 1. For T arbitrarily large sc￿ becomes arbitrarily close to 1, so that 1 ￿ sc￿
becomes in￿nitesimal and is accordingly denoted ds: We then consider the following thought
experiment: let us increase the allocation of researchers to clean innovation at ￿ from sc￿ < 1
to 1, but leave this allocation unchanged in all subsequent periods. Meanwhile, let us adjust
the tax ￿t in all periods after ￿ in order to leave Ydt unchanged. Then using superscript a to












d(ln(Adt)) = ￿￿￿dds + o(ds):
B-6Using the fact that that d(ln(Act)) and d(ln(Adt)) are of the same order as ds, ￿rst-order
Taylor expansions of (B.7) and (B.8) give:
d(ln(Ct)) (B.10)





















































ctd(ln(Act)) + (1 + ￿t)
" A
’









+o(ds) + o(d(ln(1 + ￿t)));
and




















ctd(ln(Act)) + (1 + ￿t)
" A
’
dt (’d(ln(Adt)) + "d(ln(1 + ￿t)))
A
’




+ o(ds) + o(d(ln(1 + ￿t))):
Then, using the fact that in the variation in question, taxes are adjusted to keep production
























































+ o(ds) + o(d(ln(1 + ￿t))):























is bounded and bounded away from 0; (iii) the terms in front of d(ln(Adt)) and d(ln(Act))
are bounded. Therefore, we can rewrite (B.10) as:














d(ln(Adt)) ￿ d(ln(Act)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)























































dt (1 + ￿t)




































will be smaller than ￿￿c=(1 + ￿￿c),
and thus consumption increases. This implies that the alternative policy raises consumption
for all periods after ￿, and does so without a⁄ecting the quality of the environment, hence the
original policy cannot be optimal. This contradiction establishes that sct reaches 1 in ￿nite
time.
Part 6: Thus the optimal allocation must involve sct = 1 for all t ￿ ~ T (for some ~ T < 1)
and Act=Adt ! 1. Then, note that (A.46) implies that even if ￿t = qt = 0, the equilibrium
allocation of scientists involves sct = 1 for all t ￿ T for some T su¢ ciently large. This is
su¢ cient to establish that qt = 0 for all t ￿ T is consistent with an optimal allocation. Finally,
equation (B.5) implies that when " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿), Ydt ! 0, which together with (12), implies




=@S = 0 combined
with (23) implies that the optimal input tax reaches 0 in ￿nite time. On the contrary, when
" ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿), even when all research ends up being directed towards clean technologies, (B.5)
shows that without imposing a positive input tax we have Ydt ! 1 and thus St = 0 in ￿nite
time, which cannot be optimal. So in this case, taxation must be permanent at the optimum.
Equilibrium pro￿t ratio with exhaustible resources
We ￿rst analyze how the static equilibrium changes when we introduce the limited resource
constraint. The description of clean sectors remains exactly as before. Pro￿t maximization by
producers of machines in the dirty sector now leads to the equilibrium price pdit =  =￿1 (as
￿1 is the share of machines in the production of dirty input). The equilibrium output level for






































which in turn, together with (5), leads to the following expression for the equilibrium produc-
















B-8while equilibrium pro￿ts from producing machine i in the dirty sector becomes:



















The production of the clean input and the pro￿ts of the producer of machine i in the clean
sector are still given by (A.33) and (15). Now, labor market clearing requires that the marginal
product of labor be equalized across sectors; this, together with (B.13) and (A.33) for j = c,












thus a higher extraction cost will bid up the price of the dirty input. Pro￿t maximization by
￿nal good producers still yields (13) which, together with (B.15), (B.13) and (A.33) for j = c,


















with ’1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ "). Hence, the higher the extraction cost, the higher the amount of
labor allocated to the clean industry when " > 1.
Using (15) for j = c, (B.14), (B.12), (B.15), (B.16), the ratio of expected pro￿ts from































































: This establishes (25). ￿
Proof of Proposition 7
First, we derive the equilibrium production of Rt and Ydt.
Using the expression for the equilibrium price ratio (B.15), together with the choice of the











































Similarly, using the expression for the equilibrium labor ratio (B.16), and labor market










































Next, using the above expressions for equilibrium prices and labor allocation, and plugging


































































































When " > 1, production of the dirty input is not essential to ￿nal good production. Thus,
even if the stock of exhaustible resource gets fully depleted, it is still possible to achieve positive
long-run growth. For a disaster to occur for any initial value of the environmental quality, it
is necessary that Ydt grow at a positive rate, while Rt must converge to 0: This implies that














must converge to zero, which is impossible since c(Qt) is bounded above. Therefore, for
su¢ ciently high initial quality of the environment, a disaster will be avoided.
B-10Next, one can show that innovation will always end up occurring in the clean sector only.
This is obvious if the resource gets depleted in ￿nite time, so let us consider the case where it















so that to prevent innovation from occurring asymptotically in the clean sector only, it must
be the case that A
￿’
ct does not grow faster then A
￿’1











dt grows at a positive rate over time, so that the resource gets depleted in ￿nite time after
all. This completes the proof of Proposition 7.
The case where " < 1: It is also straightforward to derive the corresponding results for
the case where " < 1. In particular, when " < 1, Ydt is now essential for production and
thus so is the resource ￿ ow Rt. Consequently, it is necessary that Qt does not get depleted
in ￿nite time in order to get positive long-run growth. Recall that innovation takes place in









= 1, and positive long-run growth
requires positive growth of both dirty input and clean input productions. This requires that
innovation occurs in both sectors, so A
1￿￿1
dt and A1￿￿










so that Rt grows over time. But this in turn leads to the resource stock being fully exhausted
in ￿nite time, thereby also shutting down the production of dirty input, which here prevents
positive long-run growth. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8
We denote the Lagrange multiplier for equation (6) by e mt. We can use (6) to rewrite the




Denoting the Lagrange multiplier for this constraint by ￿ ￿ 0, the ￿rst-order condition with












e mt + ￿
￿t
+ c(Qt);
where recall that b pjt = ￿jt=￿t. The wedge (e mt + ￿)=￿t is the value, in time t units of ￿nal
good, of one unit of resource at time t.
B-11The law of motion for the shadow value of one unit of natural resource at time t is then
determined by the ￿rst-order condition with respect to Qt, namely
e mt = e mt￿1 + ￿tc0 (Qt)Rt;
where e mt ￿ 0. Letting mt = e mt + ￿ we obtain:








where m1 > 0 is the limit of mt as t ! 1.













In particular, the optimal resource tax is always positive. ￿
Proof of Proposition 9
The proof proceeds in three parts: in Part 1, we prove that when ln(1 + ￿) > [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d),
then in the long run innovation must occur in the clean sector only. In Part 2, we show that if
ln(1 + ￿) < [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d) and innovation occurs in the dirty sector only or in both
sectors in the long run, then a disaster necessarily occurs. Finally, in Part 3, we derive the
asymptotic growth rate of dirty input production when innovation occurs in the clean sector
only.
First, note that the expressions for Yjt, derived above for the case where there are no well-
de￿ned property rights to the resource, still hold provided one replaces the unit extraction cost






















































































B-12Part 1: Let us assume that ln(1 + ￿) > [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d). We want to show that
innovation then ends up occurring in the clean sector only in the long run. Here, we shall reason
by contradiction, and assume, ￿rst that innovation ends up occurring in the dirty sector only
in the long run, and second that innovation keeps occurring in both sectors forever, and each
time we shall generate a contradiction.
Part 1.a: Assume that innovation ends up occurring in the dirty sector only. Then, from
(B.21), the ratio of expected pro￿ts from innovating clean to expected pro￿ts from innovating


















Thus, for innovation to take place only in the dirty sector in the long run, it is necessary for
A
1￿￿1
dt to grow faster than P
￿2










so that the asymptotic growth rate of the economy g satis￿es:
ln(1 + g) =
(1 ￿ ￿1)ln(1 + ￿￿d) ￿ ￿2 ln(1 + r)
(1 ￿ ￿)
:
Combining this with (27) gives:
ln(1 + g) =
(1 ￿ ￿1)ln(1 + ￿￿d) ￿ ￿2 ln(1 + ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿2￿
: (B.24)
Since ln(1 + ￿) > [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d), this equation implies g < 0; and therefore the
ratio of expected pro￿ts ￿ct=￿dt goes to in￿nity over time. Thus innovation only in the dirty
sector in the long run cannot be an equilibrium, yielding a contradiction.

















dt must grow asymptotically at the same rate. Then from (B.19)
and (B.20), we have
Ydt = O(Act) and Yct = O(Act); (B.25)






dt to grow at the same rate, it is then necessary (using (27)) that:
￿2
1 ￿ ￿1
(ln(1 + ￿) + ￿ ln(1 + ￿￿csc)) +
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿1
ln(1 + ￿￿csc) = ln(1 + ￿￿d (1 ￿ sc))
B-13which in turn is impossible if ln(1 + ￿) > [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d) (the above equation would
then imply that sc < 0, which cannot be).
This concludes Part 1, namely we have shown that if ln(1 + ￿) > [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d)
then innovation occurs in the clean sector only in the long run.
Part 2: We now show that if innovation does not switch to the clean sector in ￿nite time
then a disaster is bound to occur when ln(1 + ￿) < [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d). Indeed, suppose
that innovation does not switch to the clean sector in ￿nite time. Then, either innovation ends
up occurring in the dirty sector only, or innovation keeps occurring in both sectors forever. In
the former case, dirty input production must grow at rate g given by (B.24), which is strictly
positive if ln(1 + ￿) < [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d). In the latter case, (B.25) implies that Ydt
will grow over time, again leading to a disaster.
Part 3: We now assume that innovation occurs in the clean sector only. Using (B.20) we






Thus overall Ydt grows at rate gYd satisfying:
ln(1 + gYd) = (1 ￿ "(1 ￿ ￿))ln(1 + ￿￿c) ￿ "￿2 (ln(1 + ￿) + ￿ ln(1 + ￿￿c)):
Now, if gYd > 0; then a disaster cannot be avoided. However, when gYd < 0, and provided that
the initial environmental quality is su¢ ciently large, a disaster is avoided.
Conclusion: Part 1 shows that when ln(1 + ￿) > [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d), innovation
must eventually occur in the clean sector only. Part 3 then shows that in that case and
provided that (1 ￿ "(1 ￿ ￿))ln(1 + ￿￿c) ￿ "￿2 (ln(1 + ￿) + ￿ ln(1 + ￿￿c)) < 0, a disaster is
indeed avoided for su¢ ciently large initial environmental quality. This last condition in
turn is met whenever " > 1
2￿￿￿￿1 if ln(1 + ￿) > [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿ max(￿d;￿c)). This
proves the ￿rst claim of Proposition (9). Then Part 2 establishes that when innovation
does not occur in the clean sector only in the long run, then a disaster is bound to oc-
cur if ln(1 + ￿) 6= [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d) (when ln(1 + ￿) > [(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d),
we know that innovation has to occur in the clean sector asymptotically). Finally, Part 3
shows that even when innovation ends up occurring in the clean sector only, yet a disas-
ter occurs if (1 ￿ "(1 ￿ ￿))ln(1 + ￿￿c) ￿ "￿2 (ln(1 + ￿) + ￿ ln(1 + ￿￿c)) > 0 or equivalently
if ln(1 + ￿) < (1=" ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2￿)ln(1 + ￿￿c)=￿2. Thus no matter where innovation oc-
curs asymptotically, if ln(1 + ￿) < (1=" ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2￿)ln(1 + ￿￿c)=￿2 and ln(1 + ￿) 6=
[(1 ￿ ￿1)=￿2]ln(1 + ￿￿d), a disaster is bound to occur. This proves the second claim of Propo-
sition (9).
Perfect competition in the absence of innovation
Here we show how our results are slightly modi￿ed if, instead of having monopoly rights
B-14randomly attributed to ￿entrepreneurs￿when innovation does not occur, machines are pro-
duced competitively. There are two types of machines. Those where innovation occurred at






1￿￿ LjtAjit. Those for which innovation failed are produced competitively. In this case,
machines are priced at marginal cost  , which leads to a demand for competitively produced






1￿￿ LjtAjit. The number of machines produced under
monopoly is simply given by ￿jsjt (the number of successful innovation).



















































is the average corrected productivity level in sector j (taking into account that some machines
are produced by monopolists and others are not).































































This yields the modi￿ed lemma:
































































This modi￿ed lemma can then be used to prove the analogs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 in
the text. The results with exhaustible resource can similarly be generalized to this case.
Calibration for the exhaustible resource case
We perform a similar calibration exercise as in the Section 6. As in the text, a time period
corresponds to 5 years, ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1=3, and Yc0 and Yd0 are still identi￿ed with the world
production of energy from non-fossil and from fossil fuel origins respectively between 2002 and
2006. The de￿nitions of S, ￿, and ￿, and the utility function u(C;S) are also the same as in
the baseline calibration. To map our model, which has one exhaustible resource, to data, we
focus on oil use and we compute the share of world energy produced from crude oil in the total
amount of energy produced from fossil fuels from 2002 to 2006 (still according to the EIA).
We then convert units of crude oil production and stock into units of total fossil production
and stock by dividing the former by the share of world energy produced with oil relative to
the world energy produced by any fossil fuel. We approximate the price for the exhaustible
resource in our model by the re￿ner acquisition cost of imported crude oil in the United States
(measured in 2000 chained dollars and again taken from the EIA). We extract the trend from
the price series between 1970 and 2007 using the HP ￿lter with the smoothing parameter of
100. We then restrict attention to the period 1997-2007 (during which the ￿ltered real price
of oil increases) and parameterize this price trend as a quadratic function of the estimated
reserves of fossil resource. The estimated price of the fossil resource in 2002, combined with
the consumption of fossil resource between 2002 and 2006 together with the value of world
GDP from 2002 to 2006 from the World Bank, and the initial values of Yc0 and Yd0; then allow
us to compute ￿2, Ac0 and Ad0 and the cost function c(Q) as the price of the exhaustible
resource in units of the ￿nal good. This procedure gives ￿2 = 0:0448. Finally ￿c is still taken
to be 2% per year, but ￿d needs to be rescaled. Indeed, if innovation occurs in the dirty sector




d instead of Ad, so we compute ￿d such that innovation in the dirty sector
still corresponds to the same long-run annual growth rate of 2% after making this correction.
We now show how the optimal policy with exhaustible resource compares with that in the
baseline case for the four con￿gurations of (";￿) (" taking the high value of 10 and the low
value of 3, ￿ taking the high value of 0.015 and the low value of 0.001).
B-16Optimal policy for " = 10 or 3 and ￿ = 0:015 or 0:001, in exhaustible and non exhaustible cases
As illustrated by Figure 2B, the switch towards clean innovation again occurs immediately
for (" = 10;￿ = 0:001), (" = 10;￿ = 0:015) and (" = 10;￿ = 0:001). The switch to clean inno-
vation occurs slightly later in the exhaustible resource case when (" = 3;￿ = 0:015). The reason
for this slight delay is that even though the growth prospects in the dirty sector are hampered
by the depletion of the resource (this pushes towards an earlier switch to clean innovation),
we also have that less dirty input is being produced in the exhaustible resource case, which in
turn can accommodate a later switch to clean innovation. Which e⁄ect dominates in practice
depends on the parameters.
Moreover, with the exhaustible resource, the clean research subsidy does not need to be as
high as in the baseline case to induce the switch because of the costs of the resource (see Figure
B-172A). For the same reason, the carbon tax does not need to be as high either (Figure 2C) and the
switch to clean production occurs earlier than in the baseline, except when (" = 3;￿ = 0:015),
whereby the later switch in innovation mitigates the e⁄ect of the increase in the extraction cost
so that the switch to clean production occurs around the same time (Figure 2D). The ￿gure
also shows that when " is smaller, the resource tax needs to be higher, as more of the resource
ends up being extracted at any point in time, and that temperature increases less over time
with the exhaustible resource.
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